Of Elitism, Clientelism and Duterte-ism
1898. Philippines gained its independence from more than three centuries of Spanish colonization through a well-orchestrated Paris Agreement leading to the Mock Battle of Manila Bay in August of 1898. What followed was close to five decades of training, an apprenticeship for representative democracy under the tutelage of the Americans. In 1946, we said we were ready to stand on our own making the Philippines the bastion of democracy in Asia. These years of freedom made us the oldest but not necessarily the most successful democracy in the region.
Being the oldest democracy in Asia was both a blessing and a curse. It was a blessing because its vision allowed us to innovate and mature democratically ahead of our neighbors. We were able to install social and political safeguards protecting the fundamental liberties of the people and re-adjust the same until we can find the perfect fit for the Philippine context. It is a curse at the same time for the very same reason. We get the first taste of its bitter failures.
Since then, we have been constantly searching for a formula of democracy that will truly liberate the Filipinos from the shackles of bondage brought about by unemployment, poverty, ill-health, conflict, corruption, in-security, criminality and many more. A democracy that is truly for the people, by the people and of the people remains to be so elusive up until now.
Patronage, Power and Politics
Philippine local politics have oftentimes been described within the patron-client factionalism framework of Carl Lande (1965) characterized by an inequitable vertical relationship between a landed, usually feudal and dynastic patron who is recompensed with support, services and loyalty by the client for the resources, material or otherwise, that he/she is benefitted with from the former. It is a whole-person reciprocal dyadic tie between persons of different status based on the values and social relations of traditional society (Kawanaka, 2002). This tie is based on reciprocity – the patron through material inducements get the much needed votes from the client and, vice versa, the client in need of resources pledge loyalty to the patron.
However, Kit Machado (1971) pointed out the emergence of “new men” who are non-landlord professional politicians from relatively lower social classes challenging the elite rule of the feudal lords. They came from the fields of medicine, agriculture, law, military and other professions necessitating the creation of political machines to ensure their continued perpetuation in power. These new breed of warlords, caciques, trapos or bosses became the emergent power holders in local politics governing almost without intervention from the state. The only way to protect the economic and political interests of these “new men” is through control of the local power.
To name a few examples, Fr. Among Ed Panlilio became an alternative candidate for Pampanga’s gubernatorial race in 2007 espousing a principled politics against the alleged Jueteng Lord Pineda. Sol Aragones also emerged as a new option in Laguna though riding on her popularity as a TV newscaster. Pacquio was considerably a “new man” in the realm of local politics when he ran to represent the province of Sarangani. However, “Pacquiao” was already a household name even before he launched his candidacy. Despite the troubles brought about by local politics, these “new men” still braved the dungeons where struggle for power is the name of the game.
Over the years, local politics have been captured by a few powerful clans and network of clans handed from generation to generation subjecting the Philippines to further misery.
Some of these are the Remulla and Maliksi of Cavite, who were former allies but divided by the desire to stay in power making the province a regular hotspot area during elections. Farinas against Farinas in Ilocos Norte shows the dynastic character of local politics with blessings from the greatest dynasty of the North – the Marcoses. The Ejercitos and Zamoras of San Juan staging a David versus Goliath battle are also families who were in control of the city for years and counting.
These prove that Philippine local politics have always been described as the politics of “kaway, akbay at kamay.” Competition for elective offices was always treated as a popularity contest where those with the most charm, flair for rhetoric, perceived accessibility to the people (madaling malapitan), and admittedly with good looks will have more chances of capturing the people’s hearts. The sing-and-dance breathers that candidates do during political sorties make them more relatable to the masses.
Apart from kaway-akbay-kamay, guns-goons-gold were also used as regular election instruments by many local politicians in order to ensure their hold in power. Nothing can be more horrifying than what happened to around 58 people who were butchered in broad daylight in Ampatuan, Maguindanao year 2009. The use of widespread violence casts fears upon the electorates just like in Abra where terror prevailed in 2007 allegedly to silence the political enemies of the Bersamins.
Paul Hutchcroft as cited by Kawanaka (2002) in Power in a Philippine City, emphasized that “access to the state apparatus remains the major avenue to private accumulation, and the quest for ‘rent-seeking’ opportunities continues to bring a stampede of favored elites and would-be favored elites to the gates of the presidential palace.” Therefore, the state instrumentalities are held hostage by elective officials in this relationship. Compounded by the wide latitude of discretion given to elected officials in deciding how to use the state’s resources, holding an elective post becomes crucial in attaining and sustaining power.
Duterte and his Local Machine
Since the restoration of democracy via people’s power in EDSA in 1986, the Dutertes have been ruling the City of Davao. It may be traced back to the early 50s when Atty. Vicente Duterte, father of Rodrigo R. Duterte became governor of the then singular province of Davao before it was divided into several provinces as it is now. Prior to 1988, Davao City was in the hands of different mayors from Santiago Artiaga in 1937 until Jacinto Rubillar in 1987 with only Carmelo Porras serving the longest term of 11 years from 1956 to 1967 (Davao Archives, 2011).
From 1988 to the present, no other political family governed Davao City but the Dutertes except the one term interlude of Benjamin de Guzman in 1998-2001. During such period, Duterte served as representative of the 1st District of Davao City to the Philippine Congress.
During his more than two decades as mayor of Davao City, Rodrigo R. Duterte transformed the city from a haven of lawlessness into one of the safest cities in Southeast Asia with low crime rates allowing residents and visitors to roam the streets at night without fear or hesitations. Duterte’s harsh crime-fighting tactics earned him the nicknames “the Punisher” and “Duterte Harry.”
No one challenged the Dutertes except that in recent local elections, only the Nograleses came closest to the attempt at unseating the Dutertes in Davao City. For Davaoenos, the Nograles and Duterte are arch-nemesis in politics until Duterte’s presidential bid in 2016. Prospero Boy Nograles attempted at the mayoralty post three times (1992, 1998, and 2010) and failed at it three times as well, even against the Duterte-backed Ben de Guzman in 1998. The 2010 mayoralty race can be considered as one of the most hotly contested elections in the history of Davao City where Prospero Boy Nograles went face to face against Sara Z. Duterte, with Rodrigo running for vice-mayoralty post.
Interestingly in 2010, the Nograles camp bannered the slogan, “Change we need, Change we must” alluding to an end to the Duterte rule in Davao City. Duterte matched this campaign slogan with, “Why change? We have the best.” But the 2016 reconciliation of the two political clans led to a national campaign platform of change.
To strengthen his desire in making Davao City a stronghold, Duterte created a powerful local machine known as the Hugpong sa Tawong Lungsod, involving key barangay captains whose loyalty cannot be questioned.
The Hugpong sa Tawong Lungsod is a Davao City-based political organization composed of leaders associated with then mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte. It was registered with the COMELEC on March 28, 2011 in preparation for the 2013 Midterm Elections. It was through this machine that the Dutertes were able to reach out to all the 182 barangays of Davao City. It was also through this machine that national (senators) and local (councilors) candidates sought endorsements to gain support from the vote-rich Davao City. National politicians needed Hugpong for their campaigns while local politicians expect them to facilitate the inflow of national resources. A quid pro quo arrangement facilitated by local machines like Hugpong.
Hugpong also showed its ability to sanction. In the 2016 elections, some members (kapitans) were removed on account of supporting a different candidate in the congressional seat of the 3rd district of Davao City. Some 70 barangay captains suffered the ire of Vice Mayor Paolo Duterte who sponsored the resolution removing them from the roster of members. Losing membership could also mean the end of their careers as barangay captains. For as long as Hugpong has the monopoly of resources (political and economic) in Davao City, it can always use sanctions to exact loyalty from its village leaders.
For what Duterte has done to the city of Davao and its people, along with all the developments that his political leadership has brought to the city, Duterte can now be considered as an institution in Davao – a ruling political dynasty enjoying the trust and confidence of its people.
In the 6th Citywide Social Survey (CWSS) conducted by Ateneo de Davao University in October 2016, President Duterte enjoyed a net satisfaction rating of 94.93% from his home turf. A personal support to him spilled over to the support for his national administration with 90.63% net satisfaction rating, one which is incomparable to other government bodies like the Senate (67.14%), House of Representatives (67.14%) and the Supreme Court (63.17%). Having Duterte as a family name is not an assurance though of strong constituent support. The disparity in the net satisfaction rating between Mayor Sara Duterte (96.36%) and Vice Mayor Paolo Duterte (87.31%) is quite striking. This shows that performance also mattered to the Davaoenos and that a Duterte is yet to prove his/her ability to run the city like how PRRD did it in the years past.
Quite alarming though that support for PRRD can lead to disregard for rule of law and human rights. Whether the president is right or wrong, quite a sizeable number of his Davao supporters would turn a blind eye on critical legal and ethical issues. For example, the same survey showed that 27.94% of the respondents believed that the Davao Death Squad is essential in solving criminality and that the means the DDS employ is just (11.27%). Only 6.83% believed that it is against human rights.
The campaign platform of PRRD seemed to have gained support with 69.46% expressing the need to pursue federalism for it will facilitate equitable distribution of resources (81.33%) and that a federal government can empower the regions (77.33%). Only 8.67% feared that federalism will strengthen political dynasties.
The president is also enjoying huge support for his anti-drugs campaign with 87.46% approval of the current efforts to solve the drug problem, agreeing further to Oplan Tokhang (64.4%) as a saturation drive method in the communities. 35.72% also favored Extra Judicial Killings stating that it is done anyway by vigilantes (20.32%), drug syndicates (20.95%) and only a few police officers (12.22%).
An overwhelming 74.76% of the respondents also agreed with the President’s decision to finally put to rest former President Ferdinand Marcos in the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
The pattern how Davaoenos think and behave reflect the overwhelming trust they have for the president. They trust the president’s wisdom and prudence even to a fault with outright disregard to dissent and counter-consciousness. In social media, one is vilified as “dilawan” when criticism is hurled at the president, no matter how constructive it can be. There seems to be a difficulty in distinguishing the policy and the policy-maker.
Duterte’s Brand of Cacique Elitism
At least three decades ago, the Cory Aquino-led people’s power toppled the fourteen years of Marcos’ dictatorship and restored democracy in the Philippines. EDSA (1986) ended the exploitation of the state’s resources perpetuated through crony capitalism, warlordism, monopolies and abuse of power in many forms. The fall of martial law promised a better Philippines – or did it?
Cory Aquino, while ending the dictatorial regime, nonetheless, rebuilt the elite-dominated democratic structures weakened by authoritarian Ferdinand Marcos during her 1986-1992 administration (Anderson, 1988) making her an “elite restorationist,” according to Benedict Anderson. The executive and legislative branches of her administration were filled again by traditional, resource-rich and dynastic political families who were largely in control of power, people and property (3Ps) in the pre-martial law period.
Thirty years passed but the same old nagging problems beset the country. Nothing much has improved as promised by the triumph of EDSA. Unemployment continued to soar, armed conflict almost regularly displaced thousands of people, natural resources were fed to the exploits of multinationals, traffic had worsened, health condition had degenerated, the rich became richer and the poor, poorer – all these are reminiscent of the martial law days or even worse.
No wonder, the Filipinos have mustered so much frustration, either consciously or unconsciously, over the years in their continuing search for that elusive genuine development. This is the same frustration that brought us all to the streets of EDSA in 1986. The cacique democracy that defined the Philippine political landscape pulled the country down to its lowest in some recent years with the exemption of a few intermittent better-performing-though-not-sustainable administrations. The country is therefore desperate in finding a better alternative than the “cacique parasitical” relationship which only benefited the privileged class and marginalized further the downtrodden.
The question now is, did the 2016 elections end the Philippine’s cacique democracy? Was Rodrigo R. Duterte the new face of Philippine politics?
In Timberman’s Elite Democracy Disrupted, he said that “the sixteen-million Filipinos who voted for him appear to have done so because they are tired of what they see as ineffective and often corrupt political leadership, and they believe that Duterte is a courageous leader capable of delivering real change (2016).”
Capitalizing on the promise of change by bringing crimes down, eradicating drugs, pursuing peace and using Davao as his principal exhibit, Duterte was able to catapult himself from the bottom of the pre-election surveys to the top just weeks before election day, and eventually the presidency. His charisma, lack of pretentions, tough-talking, and sincere heart for the poor appealed to the electorates across all social strata as an antidote to the decades-long rule of the elite class.
However, I see Duterte as nothing much different from his predecessor ruling elites though packaged in a populist authoritarianism despite his self-confession of being a socialist. He may not be the cacique as described by Benedict Anderson, who, like the coopted chieftains of the Spanish colonizers became feudal lords.
Instead, he manifests cacique mentality able to wield power and wealth upon people and institutions especially opposed to him. In Dr. Sylvia Estrada-Claudio’s “The Cacique in our Midst,” (Rappler, September 14, 2014) she pointed out that elitism as a mentality can come from the poor once they have made it to the top. Even the lower middle class can think, speak and act like caciques.
Duterte is no exemption. It may not be absolutely true that he is a self-made man and that his humble origins made him more appealable to the poor. His great ancestors were known established politicians in Danao, Cebu before his father Atty. Vicente Duterte and mother Soledad Roa transferred to Davao where the former became Governor in 1959. His mother was a public school teacher until her retirement in 1952 and eventually became the leader of the “yellow Friday” movement against the Marcos dictatorship (Filipino Genealogy Project, 2015). In short, the Dutertes have already carved their niche of power in Davao as early as 1950s and Digong has benefited from that.
When he took his oath of office as the 16th President of the Republic of the Philippines, he committed to be guided by the rule of law in his relentless campaign against drug syndicates and that he will honor all treaty obligations of the Philippines under different international human rights conventions. However, we also heard him several times issuing a death warrant to all human rights defenders should his targets would not come to fruition.
During the campaign period, he was applauded when he vowed never to declare martial law since it did not do us good historically. But just barely a year in office, he subjected the entire island of Mindanao under martial rule with threats of extending it to the entire nation. He also jokingly promised to board a jet ski and plant the Philippine flag in one of the disputed islands in West Philippine sea. But despite the international tribunal’s favorable decision to the Philippines, his administration now takes a back seat and makes concessions for a joint exploration agreement.
President Duterte proudly carried as his flagship exhibits landmark legislations in Davao. Aside from the firecracker and smoking bans, he presented as an added value being the first if not among the pioneering LGUs to have legislated a Women’s Development Code and Anti-Discrimination Ordinance. Yet, he finds nothing wrong with catcalling (Mariz Umali case), sexist jokes (VP Leni case) and womanizing (Speaker Alvarez case) at the same time uses homosexuality oftentimes to demean those who dissent (recent Gascon case).
In aid of fast-tracking the peace negotiations with the CPP-NPA-NDFP, Duterte installed left-allied and progressive cabinet secretaries like Lopez, Taguiwalo, and Mariano. But under the excuse of the iron curtain rule of separation of powers, he washed his hands and said there is nothing he can do about it despite the CA being dominated by his political allies. This is quite contrary to his use of strong-arm politics in pushing for the restoration of death penalty where party members who voted against it were stripped off of their committee leadership.
The above-cited instances are exemplifications of his “cacique-ism.” Poisoned by the power that corrupts, the hubris in him can easily transform the Duterte loved by the 16 million voters to the monster that everybody will disdain. As a Davaoeno and having him as a mayor for 23 years, I was praying so hard that when he won as President, he will not self-destruct. Unless, he takes control of the reins of his sanity, he can still probably be the anti-thesis to cacique elitism in the Philippines.
To me, the hope that Duterte brought in the 2016 elections is still blurred by the veil of ironies. Most often than not, he is an oxymoron himself. The incoherence and inconsistency in his actions and pronouncements largely brought by his impulsive decision making will lead the nation in disarray. We are yet to substantiate what is in the rhetoric of change.
But just like what Timberman said: “Whether that change will revitalize or damage Philippine democracy will depend on the level of support Duterte receives from the Filipino public as well as the response of elite groups and key institutions (2016).” Apparently, the President still enjoys an unprecedented support and trust from the people.
But, we cannot also underestimate the power of these people. Duterte must not forget that he is, just like many other presidents, a president by plurality and not by majority. We have done it before. There is no reason why it cannot be done again. After all, salus popli est suprema lex, the welfare of the people is the supreme law. It is for us to decide now: are we in for genuine democracy or are we up for another dictatorship?
Conclusion
Cacique elitism is not only manifested in the feudal-like lifestyle of the ruling class but moreso as a mentality espoused even by the poorest of the poor. A poor person or a middle class person can have the most elitist disposition towards somebody else. A teacher can abuse a student, a driver can look down on a passenger, or a newscaster can speak ill of a crime victim. The circumstances around and between people can define a cacique frame of thinking. This mentality propagates a clientelistic relationship whereby the need for survival of the masses is taken advantage of by the ruling elites who in turn needs to perpetuate themselves in power since this is the only and most legitimate access to wealth accumulation. Elitisim is thereby reproduced through various means including the use of political machines to augment the strength in the use of violence, wealth, power, kinship and ties. Unless, his attention is called at the most opportune time, Duterte might be giving birth to his own brand of cacique elitism – his own version of Duterte-ism.
(photo from Rappler)
Cited References
Anderson, Benedict. 1988. Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams, New Left Review 1 (169), pp. 3-31.
City-wide Social Survey Series 6. October 2016. University Research Council, Ateneo de Davao University.
Estrada-Claudio, Sylvia. September 14, 2014. The Cacique in Our Midst. Rappler. https://www.rappler.com/views/67808-cacique-culture
Filipino Genealogy Project. November 24, 2015. The Race to Halalan 2016: The Genaealogy of Rodrigo Duterte. http://fil-gen-pro.blogspot.com/2015/11/the-race-to-halalan-2016-genealogy-of.html
Kawanaka, Takeshi, (2002). Power in a Philippine City. Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies/Japan External Trade Organization.
Lande, Carl H. (1965). Leaders, factions and parties: The structure of Philippine politics. New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Monographs, No. 6.
Machado, Kit G. (1971). Changing Aspects of factionalism in Philippine local politics, Asian Survey 11 (12(, pp. 1182-1199
Mayors of Davao City: Past to Present. January 24, 2011. Davao Archives Wordpress. https://davaoarchives.wordpress.com/2011/01/24/city-mayors-of-davao-past-to-present/
Timberman, David G., 2016. Elite Democracy Disrupted?, Journal of Democracy, 27 (4), pp. 135-144.
