The ballots will decide: dynasty or no dynasty
Politics of clans
The current state of Philippine political parties (that which is based on patronage) traces its roots from the feudal relationship that gave rise to cacique democracy (Anderson, 1988) in the Philippines when landlords exacted loyalty from the landless farmers to perpetuate themselves in power in exchange for material benefits. These feudal lords were eventually challenged by the rise of “new men” (Machado, 1971) from varied professions earning their way up to power and as the socio-economic landscape of the country continued to evolve, brokers emerged as a mediators between the patron and the client, particularly where patrons have many clients (Teehankee, 2012b). With the ever-growing number of clients, what used to be a dyadic patron-client relationship has transformed to become a clientelistic cluster networks (2012b). With the advent of an intricate link of network to networks, political machines as greased by money politics became a necessity to steer voter’s loyalty and votes (Aspinall, et.al., 2016).
Teehankee (2012b) in his work Clientelism and Party Politics in the Philippines, concluded that, “Filipino political parties are still largely built around vast networks of well-entrenched political clans and dynasties that constantly switch their affiliation from one administration party to another in order to gain access to state resources and patronage.” Despite the experimentation on a two-party (1946-1972) and multi-party systems (1986-present), still, Philippine politics is riddled with instability, corruption, deceit and elite democracy making the perfect formula for democratic governance so elusive until today.
But, regardless of how patronage politics evolved, whether from feudal relations to machine-operated, from local caciques to national elites, one thing remained constant - Philippine politics remained in the hands of political clans, and in fact, dynastic in nature.
Political parties as vessels of the clans
The Philippines cannot claim to have a legitimate party system in its current affairs. Political parties in this country are simply used by dynastic families to perpetuate themselves in power and therefore sustain their legitimate access to public wealth, resources and power.
There is no real citizen-party relationship as parties exist only during the electoral period to raise campaign funds and immediately after elections to ensure access to patronage (Teehankee, 2012a). As a result, the citizens do not have a sufficient basis in distinguishing one party to another in terms of their policies, ideologies, programs and platforms. All political parties promote the same rhetoric involving lofty ideals of social justice, democracy and good governance only to be forgotten once elected but revived immediately before the next succeeding election. Campaign platforms are nothing but political marketing strategies.
The fallibility that is present in the political party system of the Philippines makes party switching conveniently available. As reported by Teehankee (2012b), an average of 33.5 percent of district representatives elected to the House shifted parties. In fact, most recently, Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban), the political party that adopted President Rodrigo Duterte in the 2016 elections, has cobbled together a “supermajority” coalition in the 17th Congress less than three weeks after the May 2016 elections. The great shift after the elections elevated PDP-Laban from a 3-member party to almost 300-strongmen/women machine (Cabacungan, 2016). This therefore raises serious issues of truthfulness to party ideologies and loyalty to party principles.
Political clans perpetuate dynastic rule
Reiterating the earlier point, clans, not parties, have been the building blocks of politics in the Philippines. Continuing clan dominance is both the reason for as well as a product of the failure to develop a truly democratic electoral and party system. One of the main adaptive strategies for clan survival is to build ‘political dynasties’ in which members of the same clan seek to occupy as many local positions available, and to continuously succeed each other in these positions (Teehankee, 2012b).
The ruling elites needed to perpetuate themselves in power since this is the only and most legitimate access to wealth accumulation. Elitisim is thereby reproduced through various means including the use of political machines to augment the strength in the use of violence, wealth, power, kinship, ties and eventually building political dynasties.
What political dynasty are we talking about?
But what are political dynasties? Who are considered to belong to the political dynasties in the Philippines? Are political dynasties good or bad for Philippine political context? Should political dynasties be allowed, prohibited or regulated? Interrogating political dynasties in the Philippines is essential for us to weigh the balance between democratizing access to public service and keeping faith in the Filipino electorate as a fundamental tenet of democracy.
Citing Dal Bo, (2009), Albert, et.al., (2015) defines a political dynasty as a family that has successfully retained political power through maintaining control over at least one elective position over successive generations. A dynastic family can either be “thin” or “fat” dynasty. It is “thin” when relatives occupy the same elective position over time or an individual succeeding to an elective position previously occupied by a relative and it is “fat” if relatives occupying multiple elective positions simultaneously, be it a national or local post.
In the Philippines, the congress is yet to pass a law that defines political dynasty. At the very least, the 1987 Constitution simply provides that “the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law” (Article II, Section 26). Thirty years since the current constitution was ratified, the congress has not enacted an enabling law to breathe life into this constitutional provision.
However, bills were filed in the past congresses in an attempt to pass a law regulating political dynasties in the Philippines. In the House of Senate, Senate Bill 1906 was introduced by Senator JV Ejercito in 2013 and Senate Bill 2649 was filed by the late Senator Miriam Santiago in 2011. The lower house versions were filed by the Makabayan Bloc as House Bill 332 in 2016 and by Rep. Harry Roque as House Bill 911 in the same year.
The proposals defined political dynasty as follow:
SB 1906
“Political dynasty relationship exists when a person who is the spouse of an incumbent elective official or a relative within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of an incumbent elective official holds or runs for an elective office simultaneously with the incumbent elective official within the same city and/or province or occupies the same office immediately after the term of office of the incumbent elective official.
A political dynasty shall also be deemed to exist where two (2) or more persons who are spouses or are related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity run simultaneously for elective public office within the same city and/or province, even if neither is so related to an incumbent elective official. “
SB 2649
“Political dynasty shall exist when a person who is the spouse of an incumbent elective official or relative within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of an incumbent elective official holds or runs for an elective office simultaneously with the incumbent elective official within the same province or occupies the same office immediately after the term of office of the incumbent elective official.
It shall also be deemed to exist where two (2) or more persons who are spouses or are related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity run simultaneously for elective public office within the same province, even if neither is so related to an incumbent elective official.”
HB 911
“Political dynasty shall exist when a person who is the spouse or relative within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of an incumbent elective local or national official holds or runs for an elective office simultaneously with the incumbent local or national official within the same province, city or municipality or occupies the same local or national office immediately after the term of office of the incumbent local or national elective official.
A political dynasty shall also be deemed to exist when two (2) or more persons who are spouses or are related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity runs simultaneously for elective local or national public office within the same province, city or municipality, or same local or national office, even if neither is so related to an incumbent elective local or national official.”
HB 332
“Political dynasty relationship exists when a person who is the spouse of an incumbent elective official or a relative within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of an incumbent elective official holds or runs for an elective office simultaneously with the incumbent elective official within the same city and/or province or occupies the same office immediately after the term of office of the incumbent elective official.
A political dynasty shall also be deemed to exist where two (2) or more persons who are spouses or are related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity run simultaneously for elective public office within the same city and/or province, even if neither is so related to an incumbent elective official. “
A perusal of the proposed bills above shows similar definitions of political dynasty. All four (4) contemplates of a political dynasty that covers:
Prohibition up to the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity;
Both legal and common law spouses; and
Both the framework of a thin and fat dynasty.
Ultimately, these proposals should be put to a debate to test the willingness of the political families currently present in congress and reckon this with their vulnerabilities in eventually losing their grip of power and wealth.
It runs in the blood
Albert et.al. (2015) reported that the Philippine Congress when compared with parliaments of other countries with available data on dynasties suggests that the Philippines has one of the highest incidence of parliamentarians that belong to political dynasties at 75 per cent. Their report (2015) also estimated the prevalence of dynasties in the country across key local government positions and found it to be most widespread among certain positions especially governors (85%), vice-governors (75%), district representatives (74%) outside of the National Capital Region (NCR), and mayors (66%) and vice-mayors (50%) outside of the NCR.
The usual suspects of the political elites would include the Aquinos of Tarlac, Macapagals of Pampanga, Binays of Makati, Estradas and Ejercitos of San Juan, the Marcoses of Ilocos, Roxas of Negros, Ampatuans of Maguindanao, Climacos, Osmeñas of Cebu, Lobregats of Zamboanga, and even the Dutertes of Davao. They may have established themselves into power during the post-Marcos era but their political lineage spans back to as early as the colonial years.
However, Teehankee (2001) said that the diversification and expansion of the economy has allowed non-elite political players, of middle-class professional and entrepreneurial backgrounds, to penetrate the political arena.
The Del Mars of Cebu for instance, have shown how kinship and family ties can sustain a family in power for decades. The socialization process of a child in a political family provided the much needed political conscientization imprinting in their consciousness the idea that public service is in their bloodstreams.
The same is true with the Romualdos of Camiguin arguing that his running for a public post is a continuation of his father’s service to the province. He believes though that blood relations is no guarantee for political success since any candidate still needs to present himself/herself for the public to judge.
Political dynasties could also emanate from those who are perceived to be progressive just like the Lagman’s of Albay. Their continued stay in power, though perpetuated by name recall, is basically because of their ability to deliver both the practical needs of their constituents in the district and the national issues that confront the nation. People also remember what the politicians have done for them, that is why they get re-elected. The assumption of KriseI to Edcel's seat can be viewed as an indication that even progressive politics is not immune from the temptation of political reproduction and perpetuation.
True to Teehankee’s (2001) conclusion, “the weakness in the electoral system and party system has not eroded the crucial role of pork and patronage in legislative politics. They (new political clans) probably represent the next wave of new political players with a highly specialized and professional background.”
Political dynasties reinforce elite rule
While some political dynasties have accumulated wealth and power through their elective offices at the expense of the public, there were also those who have done great service to their people. When the provision on political dynasties was proposed in the 1987 Constitution, the framers took some time debating on its merits or demerits. On one hand, some constitutionalists believed that the ban on political dynasty is undemocratic as it limits the people’s right to choose their leaders. Commissioner Christian Monsod said that the political dynasty ban is in effect removing our faith in the Filipino people’s wisdom to choose their leaders according to their individual consciences.
Apparently, the proponents of the anti-dynasty provision prevailed arguing that the powers of the government cannot be left in the hands of a few families who have perpetuated themselves into power through the 1) the establishment and maintenance of a kinship network; 2) the organization of political machines; 3) the mobilization of wealth and property; 4) access to state resources; and, 5) the use of violence and coercion (Teehankee, 2007).
Meanwhile, Justice Caprio (2011) in a dissenting opinion emphasized the spirit of the constitutional provision on political dynasty saying that no legislations can be made only to foster the entrenchment of political dynasties and fuel feudalistic practices by assuring political dynasties easy access to public funds. He further said, “the 1987 Constitution is not neutral on the scourge of dynastic politics, a phenomenon that concentrates political power and public resources within the control of few families whose members alternately hold elective offices, deftly skirting term limits. Its exclusionary effect on access to public service led the framers of the 1987 Constitution to mandate that the State guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and that Congress prohibit political dynasties…xxx”
There are problematic areas for political dynasties in the Philippines as summarized by Albert, Mendoza, et.al., (2015), to wit: a] poverty results in the creation of political dynasties or political dynasties exacerbate bad governance failing to reduce, if not actually worsen, poverty conditions; b] political dynasties weaken the check-and-balance in the government especially when family members simultaneously occupy public offices; c] dynasties weaken the competition in the political system, resulting in less access for alternative leaders and youth leaders to be part of the political system; and d] dynasties perpetuate “personality-based politics” by prompting politicians to invest in their relatives.
In a forum at the Asian Institute of Management (Pathways to High and Inclusive Growth, 2011), Roland Mendoza of AIM Policy Center at that time, showed a possible link between poverty and political dynasties establishing that where there are dynastic families, the poverty incidence is relatively high. This is because in effect, political dynasties not only hoard wealth but also monopolizes political capital.
In a dynastic set-up therefore, the people are incapacitated to challenge the ruling clans since they do not have enough resources to launch political campaigns eventually falling into the same old trap of patronage politics governed by guns, goons and gold. In many dynastic local governments, the leaders do not have the ears to listen to their people. As a result, the legitimate grievances are unheard and the basic needs unmet on top of the sporadic violence that give the citizens a high sense of insecurity, as exemplified by the Ampatuans of Maguindanao.
If indeed there is direct relationship between poverty and dynasties as offered by Mendoza (2011), then there is a need to regulate if not prohibit it. Otherwise, the control of the elite to state resources to enrich themselves and impoverish their constituents will continue unabated.
Political education is the answer
The question is, can an anti-political dynasty law be enacted by congress at this time when it is replete with members coming from dynastic political clans? While there have been many attempts to create an enabling law against political dynasties, the proposals have not gained momentum to merit the attention of the Philippine Congress at both houses. None of the proposed bills has gone passed through the committee deliberations. How much more in a plenary session? Little hope can be gleaned from a legislative fiat.
But, what cannot be done directly can be done indirectly. If passing the anti-dynasty law is difficult if not impossible, will strengthening the political party system reduce the inequalities resulting from dynastic ruling clans? When elections are based on issues and principles, the logic in this proposition says that the candidates no longer matter. Reviving the two-party system as it was before the declaration of martial law in 1972 may perhaps reduce the need to choose based on family names and instead elect on the merits of party platforms. However, given the political history of the Philippines where even the political parties revolve around political clans who have ingrained themselves in the culture and structures of the country, we still do not have an assurance that the party system will not be coopted by the ruling families who have the resources and networks to win elections. A little more hope though can be gleaned from party reform.
Ultimately, I believe that only a discerning electorate can break the curse of patronage politics and dynastic families in the Philippines. The power belongs to the people in whose hands the fate of the candidates depends. It cannot be emphasized more that sovereignty resides in the people and all government powers emanate from them. The election has such an equalizing effect between those who have the powers and those who are denied of it. Everyone gets the chance to vote and be voted for.
Towards this end, a massive political education of all Filipinos becomes imperative – a kind of education that does not only happen prior to elections but one that is continuing and developmental to address the changing needs of the times. This must find life both in the formal and informal settings and must cut across all sectors, ages, genders and class status. Only a thorough political education can empower a citizenry to be more discriminating in their choices of leaders. Only a well-thought-out political education can enlighten a people who were blinded by the promises of patronage politics. Only a truthful political education can define the political future of the Philippines.
It is only through the ballots that people will or will not give an imprimatur to a political dynasty in the Philippines.
(photo from theclickbook)
Cited References
Albert J.R, Mendoza, R., Yap D.B, Cruz, J.F. 2015. Regulating Political Dynasties Toward A More Inclusive Society. Policy Notes, Philippine Institute for Development Studies, No. 2015-14. Pp.1-10.
Anderson, Benedict. 1988. Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams, New Left Review 1 (169), pp. 3-31.
Article II, Section 26, 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Aspinall, Edward, Michael W. Davidson, Allen Hicken, and Meredith L. Weiss, (2016). Local Machines and vote brokerage in the Philippines, Contemporary Southeast Asia 38(2), pp. 121-141.
Carpio, J. 2011. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, et al., Petitioners, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, et al., Respondents. G.R. No. 180050.
Dal Bo, E., P. Dal Bo, and J. Snyder. 2009. Political dynasties. Review of Economic Studies 76(1):115–142.
Gil Cabacungan, May 26, 2016. Read more: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/787547/from-3-to-300-pdp-laban-forms-supermajority-in-house#ixzz4uMdB8rhb
House Bill 332
House Bill 911
Machado, Kit G. (1971). Changing Aspects of factionalism in Philippine local politics, Asian Survey 11 (12(, pp. 1182-1199
Mendoza, Roland. 2011. Forum on Pathways to High and Inclusive Growth. Asian Institute of Management.
Senate Bill 1906
Senate Bill 2649
Teehankee, J. 2001. Emerging Dynasties in the Post-Marcos House of Representatives, Philippine Political Science Journal, 22 (45): 55-78.
Teehankee, J. 2007. And the clans play on. Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. http://pcij.org/stories/and-the-clans-play-on/
Teehankee, J. 2012a. The Philippines, in J. Blondel & T. Inoguchi (Eds.), Political Parties and Democracy: Western Europe, East and Southeast Asia 1990-2010. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 187-205.
Teehankee, J. 2012b. Clientelism and Party Politics in the Philippines, in Dirk Tomsa and Andreas Ufen (eds). Clientelism and Electoral Competition in Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines. Oxfor, UK: Routledge, pp. 186-214.
