Duterte’s Rise to Presidency: Powered by Gigabytes
For the most part, Philippine elections have always been characterized as clientelistic and patronage-based, where political machines, operating locally and nationally, deliver the votes through some forms of exchange – the candidates promise services based on lofty ideals and the citizens vote them in return. This is what Teehankee (2016) calls the “command votes” constituting the push facto
r that made presidents in the past through strong bailwicks and traditional political machines. He classifies these machines as money-based, party-based and government-based political machineries (2016, p.118).
However, with the advent of quad-media age (print, television, radio and internet), a new form of political marketing emerged in the Philippines. The rise of media politics highlighted the significance of the “market votes,” (2016, p.119) which in relation to the command votes, constitute the pull factor in the elections. It relies primarily on popular characteristics of the candidates, either through a remarkable image or through a significant issue, converting popularity to the much the needed votes. This is conveyed through political communication in the form of advertising to sell a product, the candidate.
Political marketing in the quad-media age
In the Philippines today more than ever, political marketing has reshaped how the candidates behave in the electoral battlefield. From mobilizing traditional ground networks, it has now evolved to a new form of multi-million war to establish dominance in the different media channels, especially so that the ban on political advertising has been lifted already in 2001.
Aspinnal, Davidson, Hicken and Weiss (2016) observed that in the past, “the bones of the campaign teams are networks of liders, well-connected local residents, arrayed in pyramidal fashion from the mayor or mayoral candidate at the top, down to the sub-barangay (district), or neighborhood (purok) level.” The national candidates have always resorted to this reliable structure in the hope of reaching out to the multitude of voters given both the physical and financial impossibility to connect with each and every voter in the country.
The rise of quad-media has lessened the sphere of influence of political machines because the former is more cost-effective and it has farther reach. This gave birth to the proliferation of campaign strategists, image builders, market analysts and media experts offering their services to potential candidates. Ultimately, the quad-media has become the most effective vessel in the recent elections in defining the relationship between candidates and the electorates.
Given the evolving landscape of political campaigns in the Philippines, marketing has become an essential component not only in electoral management but also in analyzing electoral outcomes.
According to Menon (2008), “political marketing is the outcome of the marriage between marketing and politics. As an activity and method, it reflects the penetration of the political space by marketing. Advertising, celebrity endorsement, involvement of professional consultants and campaign managers, segmentation, are some of the methods extensively used in political marketing.” However, Harrop (1990) says that it is not only about advertising, political broadcasts and endorsements, but it also covers positioning in the electoral market. This is even specified by Lock and Harris (2005) by emphasizing that the heart and core of political marketing is actually found in political communication. Advertising, positioning and communicating are key essentials to an electoral engagement.
The right mix of command and market votes: key to presidency
Following Teehankee’s (2016) analysis of the presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines, the tools that led presidentiables into electoral victory are made up of a perfect combination of both the command votes and market votes elements, a coordinated balance in the use of bailwick advantage, mobilization of machines composed of money, party and government, a popular image and a strong, relatable issue.
A closer look at the Presidents that made it to Malacañang reveals that the “right mix and astute use of popularity and machinery” (2016) was the primary determinant in catapulting a candidate into the presidency. Conversely, the elections in the past also showed that candidates with strong machines but lack popularity and those who only rode on their popularity without a supporting political machine failed to snatch the chance in leading the whole country.
In 1992, Ramos won the presidency not only because of his image as a hero in the fall of the Marcos dictatorship but also because of the anointment upon him by his predecessor Cory Aquino, giving him almost unlimited access to the resources of the government. Estrada’s popularity in 1998 through his populist campaign slogan of “Erap para sa mahirap,” was unprecedented although his victory was also attributable to the force supplied by his super coalition Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino (LAMMP), the combined machinery of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), the National People’s Coalition (NPC) and the Partido ng Masang Pilipino. Meanwhile, Arroyo clinched the presidency in the controversy-ridden elections of 2004 with the upper-hand in utilizing all government resources to her advantage being the incumbent president at that time, serving the unfinished term of Estrada. Along with this, is the massive formations of campaign organizations to supplement the ability of her political machineries. Though she faltered in establishing an image that the people find appealing, her rise to power and experience in different elections from the senate to vice presidency consistently landing in the number one spot, gave her an image of a strong and industrious leader. This compensated for her lack of credibility which worsened after the “hello Garci” scandal. Lastly, Noynoy Aquino’s successful campaign was primarily a sympathy vote for the demise of Cory Aquino bringing back to life the calls for good governance. Riding on the images of his parents who championed national reform, his commitment to the message of “daang matuwid,” and the strength of the time-tested Liberal Party, made the right mix for his presidential bid.
On the other hand, the losing candidates are telling us that when the mix of machine and popularity is wanting, the presidential campaign is doomed to fail. Santiago with a strong anti-corruption platform in 1992 never had a political machinery that operates on a national scale. De Venecia on the other hand, while enjoying strong political parties, affluence and the blessing from Ramos, he struggled with his negative image as a traditional politician in the 1998 elections. Meanwhile, FPJ’s strong image as the Philippine movies’ favorite protagonist, and perceived as yet another populist candidate in 2004 made him a very close contender of Arroyo. But his last-minute formation of a political party Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) was so weak and was suffering from internal divisions. Discussing whether or not he was really cheated in 2004 is now moot and academic. Finally, while Villar had an irresistible rags-to-riches story and the resources, enough to revive the Nacionalista Party (NP), his was no match to the outpour of support to the good governance platform of Aquino. Had it not been for the death of Cory, Villar would have snatched the presidency for having the right mix. In cases where two or more candidates have both the command and market votes, Tan (2013) suggests that the competition boils down to authenticity in messages. In 2004, Aquino’s “kung walang korap, walang mahirap,” was found to be more sincere and credible than Villar’s “sipag at tiyaga.”
Duterte’s rise to power
The 2016 Presidential election can be considered as one of the most contested in Philippine history, unfolding in a dramatic fashion which involved the last-minute filing of Duterte’s candidacy leading to his come-from-behind victory, the brazen attacks of corruption against Binay which caused his ratings to plummet survey after survey, the proposed Roxas-Poe merger to arrest the rising popularity of Duterte and the cancer-fighting political legend Santiago who was out to prove for the third time that she was the President the Philippines never had. This probably the election that expanded the battlefield from the traditional house-to-house campaigning to the employment of keyboard warriors. Facebook and twitter have never been noisier than during the 2016 election.
For many political analysts, the rise of a 8-termer city mayor from the south is an interesting subject to study not only because of his very interesting character but because of its implications to the three decades of elite-rule democracy in the Philippines. Duterte’s rise to presidency remains to be a mystery to many and attempts at decoding him have been made to fully understand where he intends to bring the country in the next six years. But the question we will attempt to answer here is, “what were the key elements that brought Duterte to the presidency?” We will try to answer this using Teehankee’s (2016) push and pull factors.
Political Machine
The election of President Duterte as the 16th President of the Republic of the Philippines is one for the books. With 81.62 percent voter turn out (Diola and So, 2016), the 2016 election is probably one of the highest in Philippine elections. As such, Duterte’s 16 million votes is also the highest approval obtained by any president in history, although this only represented 38.57 percent (2016) of the total votes cast making him a president by plurality and not majority. He also had one of the highest margins in relation to Mar Roxas’ votes at around 6.1 million. This is comparable to Erap’s 6.4 million gap from De Venecia in the 1998 election (2016), history’s highest margin in presidential elections.
Bailwick votes. Duterete’s presidency was largely supported by the votes coming from the Mindanao block pocketing 23 of its 27 provinces (Tiongson-Mayrina, Barrinetos-Villarta, 2016). It is only in the provinces of Zamboanga del Norte, Misamis Occidental, Camiguin and Agusan del Sur where he did not snatch the lead. This can be attributed to his federalism project, which seeks to empower the marginalized south especially the Bangsamoro regions, which for years have been outside the radar of imperial Manila. He spoke the language of inclusion for the most excluded peoples in the country. Hence, his usual reference to his mother’s Maranao lineage making him the son of Mindanao and appealing to the historic feat of being the first ever President from Mindanao.
While Roxas took most of the Visayas block, Duterete managed to lead in the vote rich provinces of Cebu, Bohol and Leyte. These votes reflect the ethno-regionalistic voting behavior of the Filipino electorates. The provinces Duterte took from Visayas show his family origins in Cebu and Leyte. His father was a mayor of Danao, Cebu and his clan was allegedly connected with the Durano and Almendras political magnates of Cebu. The allegiance switch of One Cebu to Duterte weeks before the election was also a factor for the win in the province. Apart from this, he was also born in Southern Leyte making the Visayas connection even stronger.
In Luzon, Duterte took away Ilocos Norte, a known bailwick of his rumored principal supporter, the Marcoses. He also led in the National Capital Region and Calabarzon, probably as a protest vote against the unfulfilled promises of the Manila elites.
This proves Teehankee’s (2016) claim that the regional votes remain to be the most reliable source of votes. And in the words of Curato (2017), “Duterte disrupted imperial Manila’s privilege, and started building a nation with a gaze coming from the south.”
Local Machine. To strengthen his desire in making Davao City a stronghold, Duterte created a powerful local machine known as the Hugpong sa Tawong Lungsod, involving key barangay captains whose loyalty cannot be questioned.
Hugpong sa Tawong Lungsod is a Davao City-based political organization composed of leaders associated with then mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte. It was registered with the COMELEC on March 28, 2011 in preparation for the 2013 Midterm Elections. It was through this machine that the Dutertes were able to reach out to all the 182 barangays of Davao City. It was also through this machine that national and local candidates from across Mindanao sought his endorsement as if anointing them to victory, to gain support from the electorates. National politicians needed Hugpong for their campaigns while local politicians expect them to facilitate the inflow of national resources. A quid pro quo arrangement facilitated by local machines like Hugpong.
Hugpong also showed its ability to sanction. In the 2016 elections, some members (kapitans) were removed on account of supporting a different candidate in the congressional seat of the 3rd district of Davao City. Some 70 barangay captains suffered the ire of Vice Mayor Paolo Duterte who sponsored the resolution removing them from the roster of members. Losing membership could also mean the end of their careers as barangay captains. For as long as Hugpong has the monopoly of resources (political and economic) in Davao City, it can always use sanctions to exact loyalty from its village leaders.
For what Duterte has done to the city of Davao and its people, along with all the developments that his political leadership has brought to the city, Duterte can now be considered as an institution in Davao – a ruling political dynasty enjoying the trust and confidence of its people.
Hugpong found a support for its national campaign through the Partido ng Demokratikong Pilipino – Laban ng Bayan (PDP-Laban), founded by Aquilino Pimentel Jr. in 1982 and merged in 1983, with its origins in Mindanao bannering the issue of federalism.
The nomination of Duterte as PDP-Laban’s standard bearer also came in a very dramatic fashion with Martin Diño initially filing the candidacy for President on the last day for filing and later on Resolution No. 2 series of 2015 proposes that PDP shall find a substitute candidate should Diño withdraw his candidacy. The resolution read in part as,
"Wherefore, be it resolved, as it is hereby resolved, to substitute Martin ‘Bobot’ Diño in case he withdraws from the presidential race with Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte who is concededly the strongest presidential hopeful of the party aside from Martin 'Bobot' Diño, and who must dutifully abide by the decision of the party." (Arcangel, 2015)
Duterte’s seeming tug-of-war game with PDP-Laban created a public necessity to call for his presidency riding on the Filipino’s hunger for change in Philippine politics. It was until the deadline for substitution in December 10, 2015 when Duterte finally sealed his commitment to be PDP-Laban’s bet for the 2016 election. Being a Mindanao-based political party, PDP-Laban, along with Duterte’s Hugpong, was instrumental in consolidating the Mindanao vote. And given the long years of experience in Philippine politics especially in its most historic interludes, PDP-Laban was crucial in mobilizing its local brokers across the country to deliver the votes for Duterte’s win. Today, PDP-Laban is the ruling majority party in the Philippines.
For Duterte’s lack of access to government resources, he was able to compensate through the generosity of donors contributing to his campaign. Hundreds of millions were poured in to support his campaign. But it is the army of volunteers from the grassroots that was the largest political machine of Duterte. While Roxas and Binay had the most organized political machine, and Poe had the star appeal being the daughter of “Panday,” Duterte had people from all walks of life pitching in to support his candidacy in forms of money, volunteer service, campaign materials, political ads, and a whole lot more. Duterte capitalized on his citizen-led political engagement which according to Curato (2017) disrupted the traditional campaign practices. Bello (cited by Curato, 2017) observed that “sponetaneity, improvisation and grassroots momentum have been the hallmarks of the Duterte campaign.”
Popularity
The market vote according to Teehankee (2016) is gauged by image and issue. The image is how the candidate is perceived by the voters, whether this is positive or negative perception while the issue is the platform being championed by the candidate which the electorates find as the most urgent of of significant importance. Duterte had a compelling story to tell coming into the 2016 election.
Strong image. Like any teledrama or fairytale, Duterte came in like a “knight in shining armour,” ready to rescue the “damsel in distress,” the damsel being the nation. Riding on his “change is coming” campaign slogan, he presented himself as an alternative, unorthodox and out-of-the-box leader with a tough-talking, crime-busting and unpretentious image compared to the very predictable packaging of Roxas, Binay ad Poe. In Timberman’s (2016) analysis, Duterte was voted by the sixteen-million Filipinos because they are tired of the recurring issues of corruption in political leadership dis-enabling the government to lift the whole nation from misery, and they see in Duterte the characteristics that will provide the much needed change.
Duterte always used Davao City as his exhibit A in all his public appearances showing how he, as a mayor, has transformed the city from once being the “salvage” capital of the south to becoming the economic and political hub of Mindanao, resulting from the restoration of its peace and order situation. His strong leadership has proven to be effective in cultivating discipline in Davao City especially in enforcing the ordinances like the ban on smoking, liquor, and speed driving. He also brags of landmark legislations being one of the first LGUs in the country to have legislated a Women’s Development Code, Anti-Discrimination Ordinance and Children’s Welfare Code among others. He has always insisted that he can do to the whole country what he has done for Davao. Although, these cannot be attributed solely to Duterte because some can be accounted to a strong peoples’ movement in Davao City. The laurels belong to the people of Davao as much as it does to Duterte.
President Duterte enjoys the public support for his fearless image especially reinforced by urban legends of him driving taxis at night to know the sentiments of his passengers or when he forced a tourist to eat a cigarette butt for refusal to comply with the smoking ban in the city or motoring around Davao past midnight to make sure that all bars are closed at 1:00 o’clock in the morning following the liquor ban or when he orders the arrest of those who light firecrackers on Christmas and New Year’s eve. In short, he instilled discipline in the people of Davao, like how a father disciplines his children. Hence, the “Tatay Digong” monicker.
He is also seen as a problem solver with a political foresight so keen that can match the sages of the ancient times. A known strategist in running the City of Davao, he was able to bring forces, who are otherwise warring in the field, to celebrate together Davao festivals in the spirit of solidarity. He had access to almost all revolutionary fronts in the country and has helped mediate negotiations to free prisoners of war. Through him, the MNLF can freely walk the streets and join the parade on “Araw ng Davao.” When Commander Parago of the NPA died, he offered a space for the rebels to pay their last respects to their esteemed commander because he respects the cause of the left though he disagrees with their armed struggle. When the city pushed for the reproductive health ordinance, he defended the right of women to health care despite the strong opposition of the Catholic hierarchy in the city and boldly threatened the Archbishop that he is willing to put up his own church to shelter those who will be ex-communicated for supporting reproductive health. Here, he emphasized that he is not the mayor of the Catholics alone, but he is the mayor of all Davaoeños regardless of their faith. When he said he will clean the city from criminalities, he was able to give Davao the recognition as one of the most livable cities in Asia. When he said that he will restore peace in the city, he gave the residents the confidence to walk the streets at night without fear of being held-up. His image of a leader with a strong political will is what the people admired in him the most. These, on top of his very simple lifestyle and clean record from corruption, made him so appealable to the electorates.
Therefore, despite his reputation to ignore human rights and disregard due process of law, the people still see him the Philippines’ last hope for genuine reform, solely on account of his strong political will to deliver what he promises with Davao being the unadulterated examplar which he showcased to prove how strong leadership can transform a city from being a “killing fields” of the 80’s to being one of the most progressive cities today.
Relatable Issue. Capitalizing on the promise of change by bringing crimes down, eradicating drugs, pursuing peace and using Davao as his principal exhibit, Duterte was able to catapult himself from the bottom of the pre-election surveys to the top just weeks before election day, and eventually the presidency. His charisma, lack of pretentions, tough-talking, and sincere heart for the underprivileged appealed to the electorates across all social strata as an antidote to the decades-long rule of the elite class.
Going into the 2016 elections, Duterte brought with him a very strong issue that no other candidates bannered – federalism. He galvanized his Mindanao and some Visayas vote by stirring the region’s sentiments against the ills of central Manila through illustrating the inadequacies of decentralization based on the Local Government Code of 1991. Federalism was a powerful message he used to cultivate a very strong anti-Manila sentiment and to highlight the failures of the EDSA narrative since the restoration of Philippine democracy in 1986.
To him, federalism can solve the centuries old conflict in Mindanao and the other parts of the country. It will allow the regions to enjoy their own resources without losing much to the national capital; it will bring the government closer to the people and therefore will enhance people’s participation in governance; the would-be states will have more power in deciding for themselves with their unique contexts – all these were so relatable especially for the regions outside Metro Manila. The people found in Duterte a certain connection for being able to articulate what they have been complaining about for years.
But how come the demographics of the 2016 election showed that the NCR voted for Duterte, if in fact his presidency was a threat to the power that the Manila elites have safeguarded for the last three decades?
Curato cited Casiple (2016) saying that the more interesting win of Duterte is not actually in the solid Mindanao block but his win in the NCR, viewing it as “a protest vote against the ruling EDSA regime.” Teehankee and Thompson (2016, as cited by Curato) calls Duterte’s victory as a “major rupture” from the Edsa narrative. Even the people of Manila have reached their tipping point, in fact madness, for the nagging issues that remain unresolved under the hands of its political elites. And with Duterte’s Davao exhibit, they found in him a ray of hope to finally end their lamentations of Manila’s traffic, corruption in the bureaucracy, red tapes, crimes, and even drug addiction.
While Duterte shares some of his campaign platforms, especially his economic policies, with Roxas, Binay and Poe during the campaign period, he simply had the edge of a strong image that solidified his issues with credibility, sincerity and integrity.
War of gigabytes: Duterte's edge
While Duterte's presidency was catapulted by Teehankee's (2016) formula of combined market vote and command vote, he managed to establish his convincing lead with his unprecedented army of ground volunteers and keyboard warriors. The 2016 election was the birth of "giga wars" that found its battlefield in Philippine social media (facebook and twitter). Admittedly, the Duterte camp employed hundreds of online campaigners that helped propagate Duterte's issues and build-rebuild his image to make it acceptable to all markets from classes A, B, C, D to E. The presence of online campaigners in social media also fortified Duterte's political brand which appealed to most of the millennials.
Therefore, the above-review strengthens Teehankee’s (2016) assertion that a “slick image-strong-issue” combo alone does not make a president nor the three-pronged machine of money, party and government can be considered as the sole springboards in winning presidential campaigns. It must be the perfect mix of all the elements. But what used to be a politics of guns, goons and gold is now being challenged by the politics of "gigabytes" (Curato, 2017), making it the 4Gs of contemporary Philippine politics. One should muster not only what Aspinnal, et.al. (2016) calls as “brokerage network” but must also compete for the space the quad-media provides to project a powerful image and an authentic political message. This might have been the unique ingredient to the mix of Duterte's success to presidency.
Conclusion
Duterte’s win in the 2016 election is a perfect example of how the command votes can be complemented by the market votes and vice versa punctuated by the new space for political marketing. A new political machine is born in Duterte's presidency, that is, social media as a political machine. Binay and Roxas had the most experienced and sophisticated machineries. However, they suffered from a negative image of corruption (Binay) and “politics as usual” (Roxas). On the other hand, Poe had a very popularly clean image and star appeal as inherited from her late father, FPJ. But she faltered in mobilizing her political machine to convert FPJs popularity in the Bangsamoro into votes. Compared to them, Duterte had the ground works of his Hugpong and PDP-Laban. He also had his string of donors that greased his campaigns which was more than enough to compensate for his lack of access to government resources. But more importantly, Duterte’s federalism was a very compelling issue whose promise of fulfillment is so proximate given his image as a strong-willed leader. While this analysis simply hinged on identifying the key elements to the success of Duterte’s presidency, the ramifications of his incumbency is yet to be assessed in the light of whether or not, he can substantiate his rhetoric of change.
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