Triumphs and Tribulations in the Philippine Peace Processes

Introduction

The Philippines is home to some of the world’s most enduring peace processes to date. It has spent years and decades of negotiations hoping to achieve a political settlement to the armed revolutions that continue to threaten the security of the Filipinos, especially the Mindanaoans. In particular, the cases at hand are the Government of the Republic of the Philippines’ (GRP) peace tables with the 1] Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army-National Democratic Front (CNN) and the 2] Bangsamoro through the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

One of the longest, if not the only, remaining Maoist people’s revolution is that of the CNN. They began their quest for liberation from US imperialism, bureaucrat-capitalism and landlessness in 1968 when it was founded by Jose Maria Sison, though its roots date back to as early as 1930 with the establishment of the underground party known as the Partido Komunista Pilipinas (PKP). With almost five decades of struggle, the cost had been too much with over 43,000 lives and properties destroyed (Holden, 2017) and billions of dollars spent in the quest for peace. With around forty-eight (48) formal and informal talks, the GRP-CNN peace track had its own share of significant milestones and pitfalls in what seemed to be a game of hide-and-seek with peace.

On the other hand, the marginalization of the Moro history and identity cultivated deep-seated prejudices contributing to the “othering” process of the Mindanao Muslims at the mercy of privileging the northern narratives of Philippine history. The colonial past replete with acts of alienation, was the inspiration that informed the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination through the two Moro revolutionary fronts – the MNLF and MILF. Soon after the infamous Jabidah massacre in 1968, the Maguindaoan leader Udtog Matalam launched the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM), the precursor to MNLF under the leadership of Nur Misuari and the latter’s breakaway faction, the MILF which is now under the guardianship of Al Hajj Murad Ebrahim. Since then, the GPH-Bangsamoro peace track had suffered what Julkipli Wadi (2012) calls the “Sisyphean ordeal,” where cycles of development and counter-development took turns in testing the the Philippine-Moro relations.

Given the value of resolving these two armed struggles in the country, the Peace and Development Roadmap of the Duterte Administration highlights the intention of addressing the conflicts both through the vertical and horizontal peace processes. In his inaugural address (2016) on 30 June 2016, President Duterte emphasized that his “administration is committed to implement all signed peace agreements in step with constitutional and legal reforms.” Hence, the Roadmap (2016) banners the six-point agenda, to wit: 1] continuity of the GPH-MILF Peace Process through the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, 2] closure of the GPH-MNLF Peace Process, 3] continuity of the GPH-CNN Peace Process towards a Final Peace Agreement, 4] closure of the peace agreements with the CPLA and the RPMP-RPA-ABB; 5] development in conflict-affected areas, and 6] promotion of the culture of peace and conflict sensitivity in peace building and development.

Human security in the nexus of war and peace

Both the GRP-CNN and GPH-MILF peace talks are pursued based on the expanded concept of human security. For too long, the interpretation of security has been narrowly conceived only as protection of territory from external aggression, one that focuses on nation-states than people. Today, human security is conceived as people-centered (ul Haq, 1994). It means protection of people from chronic threats like hunger, disease or unemployment at the same time protection from disruptions in their daily lives brought about by conflict, disaster or crimes.

In its simplest terms, human security is understood as people’s freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom from shame and freedom from vulnerability (Tavanti, 2013). With social justice as a platform for revolution, the communist insurgency and Bangsamoro separatism are no ordinary armed rebellion solely for territorial integrity but primarily aimed at securing their people’s survival, development, dignity and sustainability. In fact, the twin conflicts of the Philippines nearing its fifth decade, are “purpose-driven,” (Santos Jr. and Rodriguez, 2010:421) that is, not only based on historical inequities but being ideological in essence with the CNN’s socialist statehood in mind and the Bangsamoro’s imagined independent Muslim state.

The two long-running conflicts, while unique in their respective developments and experiences, share many parallelisms. Both revolutions were initially set in the backdrop of the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos when he declared Martial Law in 1972. Crony-capitalism, state-authorized violence and flagrant human rights abuses employed by Marcos in his military rule agitated the revolutionary fronts to consolidate their forces in defense of their peoples and territories. Also, the legitimacy of the rebellion according to Santos Jr. and Rodriguez (2010), were derived “from the poverty and disenfranchisement that beset much of the Filipino and Moro populations.” When the people live in deep poverty, it strips them of economic security further reinforcing the threats to their fundamental freedoms, especially from want. Lastly, they are also both fighting the state as a common enemy pegged in the assertion of their right to self-determination. Despite its military strength, the State has failed to successfully quell the revolutions through the use of arms.

It is therefore clear, that human security issues appear in the nexus of armed conflict and peace process. Relentless threats to survival, development, dignity and sustainability of the Filipino and Moro communities brought about by the armed hostilities will continue to push the peace processes away from their goals, making them all the more elusive. In short, securing the people, means not only the cessation of war but more importantly ensuring that they have food to eat, stable employment, permanent housing, freedom from ill health, access to education, resilience in times of disasters and respect for their basic liberties among others. These can never be achieved by guns, but through talks.

By deciding to set aside their weapons temporarily and sit in the negotiating table, all the parties have symbolically admitted that in an armed conflict, there are no victors, only losers of war. But just like the war narratives, the peace processes had their share of triumphs and tribulations in the last fifty years.

Dancing cha-cha with the communists

According to the wisdom of CPP eternal chairperson Joma Sison, the movement’s principles are premised on the Philippines’ three major problems: bureaucrat capitalism, feudalism, and U.S. imperialism. Following the Maoist strategy of a protracted people’s war, the revolution is aimed at establishing a socialist-nationalist-democratic state. In reference to the fundamental tenets of CPP’s brand of communism, this can be made possible only through genuine agrarian reform, national industrialization and the assertion of an independent foreign policy. By and large, these are the spirit and letter of the GRP-CNN peace talks.

With the de-macrosifcation and re-democratization of the Philippines in 1986, the Aquino administration opened the peace negotiations with the CPP having the end in mind, the conclusion to the decades-long communist insurgency. For the first time in years, a ceasefire had been declared between the GRP’s AFP and the CPP’s NPA although it was quickly lifted following the assassination of Rolando Olalia, Chair of the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and the Mendiola Massacre in 17 January 1987. The all-out war declaration that ensued affected the promise of peace and stalled the peace process. According to the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (2014), the last years of the Cory administration, however, was marked by significant decrease in the membership of the CPP-NPA on account of the waning influence of communism across the world. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the cold war coming to an end and China’s surge to economic heights by embracing capitalism were among the external factors that affected the peace process.

It was in the Presidency of Fidel Ramos that many of the breakthroughs in the peace process with the CNN found life. Two significant agreements were signed under his watch: 1] the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) guaranteeing free and safe movement for those involved in the peace negotiations and 2] the Comprehensive Agreement on the Respect for Human Rights and the International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL). As a matter of goodwill, Ramos, through the Philippine Congress repealed in 1992, Republic Act 1700 or the Anti - Subversion law, a legislation criminalizing membership to the CPP and to other similar associations. This trust-building mechanism bore fruits with the recognition of the CNN and its re-appearance in Philippine politics.

Sadly, the gains of the Ramos administration were not able to sustain the peace process under Estrada’s lack of sincerity and political will. This was largely due to fundamental issues of sovereignty and political authority manifested in the government’s ratification of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1999. To the NDF negotiators, the VFA was a violation of Philippine’s national sovereignty by allowing America to establish military bases in the Philippines. This led to CNN’s severance from the peace talks and the government’s re-calibrated peace process through localized peace efforts with Estrada signing Executive Order No. 115 in 1999, which provided for the “Mechanics and Operational Structure for the Localization of Peace Efforts to Address the Communist Insurgency.”

The Arroyo government also suffered the same fate despite the attempts to initiate some rounds of peace talks. The negotiations were halted after the United States of America listed the CNN as a terrorist organization upon the behest of Arroyo in 2002 (Cassman, 2017).

By the year 2010, under the NoyNoy Aquino Administration, the GRP was reconstituted as the GPH negotiating panel. A series of informal talks in Hongkong and Oslo were conducted to revive the peace negotiations, but to no avail. Reported instances of alleged human rights violations by both sides have contributed to its paralysis of the talks and both parties failed at agreeing to resume the peace process. Pnoy’s administration instead concentrated in striking a peace deal with the Bangsamoro (to be discussed below).

The victory of Duterte in the 2016 presidential derby renewed the hopes for the resumption of the peace process with the CNN, with Duterte being known to have access into the innards of the communist movement and enjoying trust from its leadership. In a span of just one year since his assumption into office, major breakthroughs were achieved such as the reconstitution of JASIG, the implementation of unilateral and indefinite ceasefires in August 2016, the agreed timeline for the completion of the remaining substantive agenda for the talks, namely: the socio-economic reforms; the political and constitutional reforms; and the end of hostilities, disposition of forces, and amnesty proclamation for the release of all detained political prisoners – all in an accelerated fashion, something that no other administration has done in the past.

However, within the same span of time under Duterte’s administration, several breakdowns brought the negotiators back to the take off point every-now-and-then. The intermittent attacks against and by both forces led to the fluctuations in the talks. These are all compounded with the impulsive pronouncements of Duterte, usually made at the height of his ire. The revocation of JASIG, orders to arrest the released consultants, the lifting of the unilateral ceasefire and the unofficial declaration to go to full battle mode wrecked havoc to the otherwise dramatic victories, thus far, in the peace process under the Duterte presidency.

The steps taken by the peace process since the fall of the dictatorship was that of a cha-cha, with both parties as dance partners. It kept them moving but it did not get them far around the dance floor knowing that a step forward is always being recompensed by a step backward. While there were high points, much can be said about the low points too. The breakthroughs and breakdowns, milestones and pitfalls or the triumphs and tribulations had been in a constant flux in the past five administrations.

Kris-Krusing the Bangsamoro Roadblocks

Down south of the Philippines, the Bangsamoro secessionist movement straddled through centuries of struggle. Quite ironically, while the island of Mindanao is known for its moniker, “the land of promise,” it is equally referred to as “the land of paradoxes.” While it has some of the country’s richest natural resources, it is home to some of the Philippines’ poorest of the poor. Mindanao is the country’s food and fruit basket yet it shelters the most starved people among the famished communities, for while it may have contributed much to the national treasury, it gets nil from the coffers. Often said, Mindanao is the country’s “milking cow” but gets only “dog food” in return. Ultimately, the tapestry of tri-people communities shows what peaceful co-existence is, yet Mindanao hosts some of the lingering wars our history has ever known – the Bangsamoro struggle.

With 26 provinces, 27 cities, 425 municipalities and 10,065 barangays, Mindanao cannot be mistakenly perceived as a homogenous population. Diverse as it is, there are at least 18 indigenous groups, 13 Islamized tribes while the rest are mostly Christian settlers. The landscape of Mindanao has changed at the turn of the century since 1918 when the census of Cotabato for instance, showed that no single town was dominated by settlers. Today, almost all towns are controlled by migrants from Luzon and Visayas. The land dispossession of the Mindanao Muslims resulting from years of colonization, Christianization and militarization had become the fertile grounds for the Moro rebellion to grow.

Aggravating the separatist sentiments is the historical obliteration of the Moro narratives further alienating the south from the dominant discourse of what is anachronistically called “Philippine history” (Beleno, Cunanan, Gamas, Gloria, Limba and Villa, 2017). By privileging the voices of the north, history had been remised of of its duty to acknowledge the parallel struggles in the south. The Moro revolution is therefore, a resistance by the Mindanao Muslims against their default incorporation into the Philippine state after the Spanish conquest, arguing that the Sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao established by an Arab missionary, Shariff Kabungsuan, have already been in existence (2017:8-11) and were thriving even before Ferdinand Magellan set foot in the archipelago. This resulted to a divided narrative – one is the Filipino and the other, the Moro.

However, the Muslims through its Moro fronts, have transitioned from their secessionist position to one that is assimilationist by negotiating a peace pact with the Philippine government for the Bangsamoro to be integrated into the state through the constitutionally authorized creation of an autonomous region under the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Article 10, Section 18). This has evolved since the historic signing of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement to the 1996 Final Peace Agreement with the MNLF and leading to the enactment of Republic Act 6734, otherwise known as “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao” (ARMM, 1989) as expanded by Republic Act 9054, or the “Expanded Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.” The same is true with the pursuit of MILF to negotiate real autonomy for the Muslims through the sealing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB, 2012) and the eventual signing of the Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro (CAB, 2014) which are yet to find fruition through the enactment of a Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) by the current Philippine congress.

Just like their communist counterparts, the Bangsamoro peace negotiators had some twists and wrong turns towards its dream of autonomy. The timeline of the Bangsamoro struggle shows that the incursion of the American military forces into the south ended up with the deaths of many Muslims. The massacres in Bud Dajo in 1906 and Bud Bagsak in 1913, all in the island of Sulu and ultimately the Jabidah massacre in 1968 when members of the AFP killed 68 Muslim recruits who were escaping their covert training to reclaim Sabah, were the primary precursors to the Muslim Independence Movement, formed by the former governor of the empire province of Cotabato, Datu Udtog Matalam.

The continuing massacres against the Moros in Manili, Carmen and Tacub, Kauswagan and the abuses of Marcos under the martial law regime led Nur Misuari to found the MNLF to fight against the Philippine government and seek independence for the Bangsamoro. But the secessionist stance did not last long when in 1976, MNLF signed together with the government the Tripoli Agreement providing the framework for the creation of an autonomous region in Mindanao. Triggered by the signing and feeling betrayed by Misuari’s abandonment of the Muslim independence trajectory, Ustadz Salamat Hashim initiated a political spilt along with the traditional leaders of MNLF to establish what is now known as the MILF.

The 1987 Constitution of Cory Aquino provided the establishment of the autonomous regions in the Cordilleras and Muslim Mindanao. This led to the creation of the ARMM in 1989 and later on expanded through RA 9054. With this benevolence of the Aquino Administration, the Final Peace Agreement was sealed in 1996 with the MNLF. Seeing the progress that the MNLF has achieved, the MILF leadership opened its doors to negotiate peace with the government in 1997 under the Ramos Administration. However, the prospects for peace with MILF were bungled when Erap Estrada declared an “all-out-war” against them leading to the fall of Camp Abubakar in 2000. The talks resumed only with the assumption of Arroyo into the presidency. However, hostilities between the government and the MILF forces broke out in 2003 in Central Mindanao following the large scale military operations in Pikit, North Cotabato against the Pentagon kidnap-for-ransom group. Fortunately, a ceasfire was called on the same year and this was monitored by an International Monitoring Team.

A major debacle challenged the peace talks when the GPH and MILF came out with what appeared to be a “clandestinely prepared” Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) creating the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) in 2008. The MOA-AD was declared by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional saying that the incorporation of the Lumad as Bangsamoro in the MOA-AD, and the transfer of their ancestral domains to the then BJE, without the lumad’s knowledge and consent, violate the constitutional guarantee that the “State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development” (cited by La Viña and Lee, 2014). This is framed within the IPs right to a free-prior-informed consent protected under the IPRA. This breakdown ended up in intensive fighting between the AFP and MILF.

It was not until NoyNoy Aquino, when he became president, committed his administration to a comprehensive, just and peaceful solution to the Mindanao problem that a new hope dawned. After the Japan meeting between Aquino and Ebrahim, informal talks followed in Malaysia marking the first face-to-face meeting of the negotiators. While there were armed encounters between the AFP and MILF in 2011 in Al-Barka Basilan following some calls of an all-out-war, the armed encounters between the two forces dropped to zero the following year and it remained low for some years, now. The highlight came when at the end of the 32nd exploratory talks in 2012, the negotiators announced that they have sealed a Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro. This historic feat was disturbed when in 2013, some hundreds of suspected MNLF fighters took over four barangays in Zamboanga causing a standstill of the city with clashes between them and the AFP displacing more than a hundred thousand people and death of some civilians. This is now known as the Zamboanga Siege of 2013. In order to recover from a bad fall, the GPH and MILF held the historic signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in Malacañang in 2014. This agreement outlined how a Bangsamoro Government should be established. Soon after the historic signing, NoyNoy Aquino forwarded to the Congress the draft BBL for its passage. It is when the reins of the peace process were transferred to the Congress that they saw difficulty. This was further complicated with the Mamasapano tragedy in 2015 leaving 44 members of the PNP’s Special Action Forces (SAF), 18 of the armed Moro and 7 civilians, dead in pursuit of a known terrorist, Marwan. The incident tossed all doubts possible against the sincerity of the parties to negotiate peace. It derailed the peace process as prejudices and biases against the Muslims resurfaced and triggered calls for all-out-war against the Bangsamoro. From there, the rest was an uphill battle to legislate a BBL within the term of NoyNoy Aquino. He ended his term with the BBL not seeing the light of day.

The current administration of Duterte is yet to prove its commitment to resolve the Mindanao problem. His campaign speeches around Mindanao was replete with his dream to end the war because of his deep connection with the Bangsamoro, his mother being of a Maranao descent. At the moment, the Bangsamoro Transition Commission has been expanded to be more inclusive of other Moro fronts. The enhanced BBL was already submitted to Congress for its passage eventually giving birth to a new Bangsamoro Autonomy.

The GPH-MILF peace track is now at a crossroad as it awaits the imprimatur of the legislature. While the time is ticking, there is a sense of urgency in confronting the roadblocks because extremism is spreading like wildfire on the ground further fanning the flame of sensationalism in confining the issues of Mindanao as another encounter of the kris and the krus blocking the inroads we have made towards peace so far.

Making sense of the triumphs and tribulations

The twin conflicts in the Philippines, while heading towards the same direction, took different paths and with different narratives from the institutions and individuals involved. What is common in the two streams of processes though is the fact that the road to peace settlement is littered with so many triumphs and tribulations at the same time. Every time the talks progress, supervening events cause it to regress. Some factors account for the few successes and failures of the negotiations.

Teehankee (2000) cited Caouette’s use of the political opportunity structure (POS) in looking at the political outcomes of the peace processes and posited that the outcomes are affected by the interplay of internal, external and domestic factors. The success of the peace process is more likely when internally, a strong leadership with flexible ideologies is complemented by a supportive international and regional political environment. On the other hand, a deadlock is possible when there is lack of commitment either in the revolutionary movement or in the government. And ultimately, the hostilities may continue when the internal factors lack flexibility, commitment and pragmatism and the external factors do not have the support of the international community closing the doors for political opportunity (2000:142).

In the current configurations of the peace processes, taking with them years of negotiations, some internal and domestic factors need to be accounted for if we are to demonstrate how peace can be won and how war can be avoided. Let us reserve the discussion on the external factors in the future.

One of the greatest assets in successful talks is the political will of the principals on one hand and of the negotiators on the other (Bontia, Calicdan and Dureza, 2017). The call to resume the peace talks emanate from the will of the leaders and conversely, the cancellation is also decided primarily by the leaders themselves. With such will, the process either proceeds or stagnates. However, this political will is eased with some amount of personal or professional connection.

The principal breakthroughs in the negotiations during the Ramos administration for instance, can be attributed to his sincere desire to end the conflict which gained credence from the CNN’s leadership considering his important role against the Marcos dictatorship in EDSA and his background as a top brass officer in the AFP prior to becoming the president. Meanwhile, Erap’s cancellation of the peace talks with CNN and his call for an all-out-war against the MILF reflect his loss of faith in the process and resorted instead to alternative localized efforts. Noynoy Aquino invested more with the MILF peace track, hence, it moved swiftly while his lack of will to talk with the CNN shelved the gains already achieved in the past. In comparison, the effect of political will as reinforced by personal/professional links is much felt with the Duterte administration where the intent to accelerate the process through simultaneous discussion of the core substantive reforms was made possible because of the affinity that the principals have nurtured with one another in the past years, Joma Sison, being Duterte’s mentor in the latter’s college days. The same can be said with the Bangsamoro peace track, where his invocation of his Maranao bloodline and special friendship with Nur Misuari facilitated the expansion of the BTC to be more inclusive without having much disagreements.

Much can also be attributed to the political will of the negotiators which in many instances, have kept the talks afloat despite the verbal cancelation made by the principals. The bilateral themes discussion explored in the current GRP-CNN peace talks is an innovation designed by the negotiators to keep the discussion running even outside the negotiating table and in between formal meetings. Meanwhile, the expansion of the BTC to accommodate other Moro fronts and Moro organizations to consolidate the voices of Muslim Mindanao is one creative adjustments made in the GRP-MILF peace efforts.

Since war is fought in various fronts, peace must also be negotiated through different means. With strategic innovations in peace talks capitalizing on the institutional memories collected over time, the relational roots of the parties are strengthened to sometimes allow back channel approaches so that when the principals collapse, the negotiators can help put it up again.

Furthermore, like any other peace processes across the world, the Philippine peace processes have always been built upon trust and goodwill. These are silent operators that make or break a peace negotiation. These may have been shown in the trust building measures employed by the parties to the negotiations like faithful commitment to previously signed agreements. Specifically, in the Duterte administration, reconstituting the JASIG and freeing the consultants so they can freely participate in the rounds of talks or allowing for the first time Nur Misuari to speak inside Malacañang are unprecedented strides in the peace process which earned the trust of both the CNN and MNLF.

The presence of trust and goodwill is also evident when NDFP has reciprocated many agreements and requests made by the government such as the acceptance of a unilateral ceasefire and the formulation of draft agreements on the remaining substantive agenda. Allowing safe passage and/or entry to Duterte in NPA camps or MILF territories freeing prisoners of war are acts of goodwill that merited the trust of the President. These are accomplishments that were not present during the three previous administrations.

Losing this trust can nonetheless destroy everything that goodwill has built. It breeds distrust among the parties and can affect all the other facets of the peace process.

However strong the political will or well founded trust is, spoilers to the peace process can always lead to devastating consequences. These are people who employ tactics seeking to delay, destroy, or exploit the peace process. Their span of influence can range from the business community, the military, even in politics. Surprisingly, there are alleged spoilers among the parties to the negotiation given the fact that the GRP, CNN and MILF are not monolithic institutions. There are those who will stand to benefit from the wars in the country and they will ensure the peace talks are disrupted.

Local war economies will protect its interests by ensuring that the landlords, compradors, multinational corporations and foreign investors will stand in the way of genuine agrarian reform and national industrialization as perceived by the CNN. The same can be said to those who fear losing their landholdings because the same will be subjected to the exclusive powers of the Bangsamoro government. This puts the government at odds with their partners in the peace talks knowing that many of the landed elites and business tycoons are still in power. Similarly, some ground commanders of the CNN or the MILF may eventually turn as spoilers with the threat of losing their access to revolutionary taxes and authorities within their strongholds, respectively, should peace settlement be obtained. And quite recently, the revelation of alleged drug money supporting the terrorist attacks in Marawi establishes the legitimacy of peace spoilers as a force to reckon with.

However, an anti-thesis to peace spoilers is the strong presence of peace constituencies emanating from various civil society organizations, peace networks, grassroots movements, academe and even the faith-based organizations. The participation of these stakeholders as partners in the peace process generated positive results. Women and lumad groups for instance were able to secure discussions of their interests in the draft BBL thereby opening the tables to many other sectors. This expanded the peace constituencies on the ground generating more support for the peace process. Colleges and universities holding public discussions on critical peace issues send the parties to the talks important signals of the increasing clamor for a final agreement. Over the years, the continuing call of the public to continue the peace talks have kept the dream of a genuine political settlement to the conflicts, alive.

Zooming in on the leadership strength and ideological flexibility components of the political opportunity structure utilized by Teehankee (2000), we may infer that three recurring themes are essential in the success or failure of the peace talks in the Philippines.

First, the peace process may either move or not depending on the presence or absence of political will in both the principals and the negotiators. Political will, when present, must however be reinforced by personal and/or professional relationships given the cultural undertones in Philippine society. This can further be enhanced by the institutional memories found among the negotiators to establish a continuity from the past and bring the present to a unified future. When the process is fraught with herculean challenges, the strong political will may wither but not if strategic innovations are designed to keep the talks going.

Second, trust emanating from goodwill can accelerate or decelerate the whole peace process. In the Philippine experience, commitment to previously signed agreements, release of political prisoners, and imposition of unilateral or bilateral ceasefires prove to be essential elements in saving the peace talks from failing.

Lastly, the peace processes are also affected by the quality of people’s participation. The public outside the negotiating table, may either behave as spoilers or as supporters. There is a greater challenge now to expand the peace constituencies in order to counter the ill intents of the peace spoilers if we want to preserve the gains we have achieved so far in the two peace tracks.

Implications, Lessons and Conclusions

Given the above articulations on the Philippine’s longest running peace processes to date, the following implications, lessons and conclusions are proffered:

1. The two armed conflicts in the Philippines are embedded on issues of historical and social injustice – alienation of the Bangsamoro narrative for the MILF and the widening inequity among the rich and the poor Filipinos for CNN. Addressing these issues cannot be simplistically reduced to a political settlement through a peace agreement. Of equal importance to the vertical peace process is the horizontal peace process. The formal talks must be supported by peace building efforts on the ground in order to create a groundswell of support to the peace process at the same time, end the vicious cycle of armed violence especially among the youth. The Duterte administration must fulfill its peace roadmap’s agenda of development in conflict areas. Addressing the root causes of conflict is the ultimate key to peace.

1. Much has been said about Duterte’s strong political will to end the communist insurgency and the Bangsamoro rebellion. He must stay the course of peace and deliver his promise of change by not closing the doors of the negotiations. He must capitalize on the goodwill and trust given him by the CNN and the MILF. He only has five more years to prove that he is the President this country needed to attain peace and development. Specifically, he should certify the passage of the BBL as an urgent bill in order to revive the national debate and eventually schedule a plebiscite for its ratification in time for the 2019 midterm elections. On the other hand, he must call for the resumption of the GRP-CNN peace talks the soonest possible time and re-install the unilateral ceasefire even while working on the bilateral ceasefire, in order to finish the accelerated peace track and have the core documents signed before his term ends and while those holding the sacred history of the peace process are still able and willing.

1. Peace process does not exist in a vacuum. Its success and failures are contingent on several factors including the presence of spoilers. Duterte must rid his team with potential spoilers and prevent outsiders from sabotaging the peace processes by articulating the key principles his administration is standing by. These must be broad enough to allow the negotiators to innovate strategically but concrete enough to prevent possible accommodations for those who intend to disrupt the entire peace process.

1. In the process of striking peace deals with CNN and MILF, Duterte must be reminded that in the course, the negotiations must not disenfranchise marginal voices like the indigenous peoples who will also stand to suffer or benefit from the outcomes of the peace talks. He must be conscious that no further minoritization of the lumad should take place while attempting to take the people of the Bangsamoro and those represented by the CNN out from the margins.

1. That indeed peace is not a destination, it is a journey. It is not a result, but a process.

(photo from Bayan USA)

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