"Chinafication" and Democratization in Greater Mekong: Challenges to Good Governance
Precis
Southeast Asia is still far from the ideal political integration it envisioned upon the founding of ASEAN in 1967. This is partly because there is no singular political culture that may allow this regional amalgamation akin to what the European Union has achieved. The region is simply too diverse with hardly any shared political culture and common institutional configurations.
The Great Mekong however, which is composed of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) with the exclusion of Thailand for purposes of this essay, have similarities too apparent to be ignored, not in a way though that may pave way for regionalism. These four nation-states tucked along the Mekong River share historic and geographic parallelism with each other, that is, having been colonized by western powers in the 19th century like France in the case of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and Great Britain in the case of Myanmar and now, all four are proximately within the looming reach of China being the world’s fastest growing economy. To some degree, this forced the sub-region to open its market to private players which challenged its socialist economy allowing some democratic market instruments to lay anchorage on its otherwise autocratic landscape.
This essay therefore is hypothesizing that Chinese projection in this sub-region is forcing CLMV to look inwards and re-think its nationalist position through Morgenthau’s (1973) equilibrium proposal amidst the Chinese bargains of economic solution to their ailing economies. But as it opens up and look outwards to join the free-market economy in the hope of salvaging their national wealth, CLMV’s autocratic single party regimes are under threat of extinction with the influx of democracy-based market contraptions. As to how their governments can manage the balance between keeping the autocratic regimes in place without surrendering their economic sovereignty to China and in keeping their financial performances afloat without capitulating to democracy is a question now of good governance, which according to Donald Weatherbee (2004) underscores the legitimacy of authority through the approval of the people. I surmise that it is just a matter of time before democracy flourishes in the Great Mekong Sub-region.
Chinafication of the Great Mekong Sub-region
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and with limited exemption of Vietnam, had been “chinafied,” not in terms of language and culture but in the the economic and political ramifications where through its super presence, it is slowly encroaching within the Greater Mekong sub-region. China’s ominous presence in Greater Mekong, whether militarily or economically has shaken the sub-region’s on-going project of attaining stability. With what Crocker (2007) calls the “smart power projection,” China is able to expand influence within the sub-region slowly plundering its rich natural and human resources to China’s advantage while slowly agitating the growth of nationalist resistance from among the CLMV population. Nevertheless, China has carefully employed approaches that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions of all levels especially in the form of economic aid to expand its influence and establish legitimacy of its actions.
In Laos for example, China is considered to be the largest source of foreign investment with bilateral trade arrangement amounting to 2.34B USD reached in 2016 (China Daily, 2017). Having around 765 projects across different sectors including mining, hydropower and agriculture, China is investing roughly 7B USD for the development potential of this Southeast Asian republic. However, it goes not without huge trade-offs affecting Laos’ environment, people and politics, given China’s debauched reputation in extractive industries. Some quarters of Lao people have organized themselves to oppose the large-scale plunder of their resources, a posture protective of their national interests.
The same can be said for Cambodia where China is now its largest economic partner and aptly described by PM Hun Sen as “the most trustworthy friend” of Cambodia. Being the biggest foreign aid provider, China has given more than $200 million annually since 1992 and has provided about $3 billion in concessional loans and grants to Cambodia (Var, 2016). However, with the seeming neglect of the welfare of the average Cambodian and the adverse effects of Chinese development aid to their resources as seen in the controversial Boeung Kak Lake development project in Phnom Penh allegedly displacing illegally 4,000 families, many Cambodians have condemned China showing huge potential for a series of social unrest and violence in the name of national interest.
Meanwhile, my visit to Myanmar in 2017 revealed a sad truth about China’s control over the country’s jade extraction. Myanmar is considered as the world’s top jade producer yet suffers from social inequities, principally because the economic returns of jade trade do not inure to the benefit of the locals but to foreign extractors instead, China being on top of the list. Kyaw Hsu Mon (2016) reported that Myanmar’s jade production in 2014 alone amounted to as much as 31B USD. However, a huge percentage of this is said to be enriching illegal Chinese traders and “from which a shadowy network of military-linked companies and non-state armed groups profit.”
It appears though that only Vietnam among the four countries in the Greater Mekong area is able to toggle military and economic strength with China. While China remains to be Vietnam’s largest trade partner in support services like consumer goods, rice importations, electronics, telecommunications and others, it has constantly encountered some bouts of confrontation over the contested territories in South China Sea with the Vietnamese rallying behind their government in defense of their territorial sovereignty. The key to Vietnam’s offensive diplomacy is founded on its multilateral foreign policy. The Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee re-affirms its “partners and targets” (đối tác và đối tượng) principle (Truong-Minh Vu, 2015) where those obstructing Vietnam’s development are classified as targets and those supporting it are partners. There is wisdom in maintaining an astute mix of military strength and diplomatic skills in keeping foreign relations afloat. The Vietnamese have managed to resist with force Chinese incursions in their claimed territories in South China Sea while still being effective in luring Chinese investors to Vietnam.
The four cases above-mentioned shows the resurgence of nationalism in the Greater Mekong area with the constant threat of economic and political chinafication. The Chinese expansionism in Laos, co-opted fidelity in Cambdoia, resource extractivism in Myanmar and the offensive diplomacy of Vietnam altogether created a climate of mistrust and unrest ripe for nationalism in Greater Mekong. In the attempt to keep their national identities intact in the face of Chinese incursions, nationalist sentiments have elicited varied state posturing.
Morgenthau (1973) explained this fully well in his postulates of power equilibrium where the balance of power between weaker states and the stronger states is essential for the state’s preservation and the stabilization of the community of sovereign nations. Without equilibrium, powerful states will eventually gain ascendancy over weaker states, encroach upon their resources and rights and ultimately destroy them. With balancing, Vietnam showed that it needs to creatively repel the threat that China poses to its sovereign integrity and contain it from further causing harm even if it meant counter-staging a military might. Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar on the other hand appears to follow Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) “bandwagoning” approach as they abandon the hope of preventing China from gaining power at the expense of their people and resources and instead unified themselves with their plunderer, possibly to get at least some small portion of the spoils of competition. But with the growing social unrest in CLMV, it appears that nationalism is now reinforcing the need to follow Vietnam’s inclination to balance power against the region’s most voracious consumer – China – not only in military strength but more importantly in economic might.
However, exponential growth in economy of all the four countries in Greater Mekong combined, is what it takes to match China’s strength and it goes with a lot of structural and policy adjustments including the re-interrogation of CLMV’s autocratic regimes.
Democratization of Markets in Autocratic Greater Mekong
The post-colonial reconstruction attempts of CLMV showed the consolidation of autocratic regimes in the latter half of the 20th century which granted dominant political parties monopolistic control over state institutions and economic drivers. For a while, they have enriched themselves under the single-party government they have embraced. Slowly at the turn of the century, these countries gradually shifted from centrally-planned and state-owned economy to market economy due to some economic setbacks forcing them to open up to private players. This challenged their ability to keep the levers of control within the hands of the old political elites and their co-opted networks. The question is, how long before the guards of this Southeast Asian Sub-region can hold the reins of autocratic power and give way for democracy given the pressures of free-market economy?
Answering the above-question necessitates an understanding of how the political elites are able to wield power after decolonization. Cambodia’s PM Hun Sen with the rise of his personalistic dictatorship (Croissant and Lorenz, 2018a), for instance, relied on the ability of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) to control electoral processes, co-opt business bureaucrats and military elites, repress political opposition and civil society organizations, tolerate human rights violations, and legitimize its claim for power by introducing democratic implements such as calling for a free but unfair multiparty elections. With the post-UNTAC relaxation of economic trade policies, Cambodia is able to access international fund grants, charges from the abuse of its resources and liberal trade arrangements. The more Cambodians see the inequities brought about by the ability of their government to buy support from the regime’s elites at the expense of distributing the economic spoils across sectors, the higher propensity to challenge the current autocratic regime exists in order to guarantee that a global economy in Cambodia can benefit the average Cambodians equally.
These economic constraints confronted by Cambodia are also plaguing Laos. They have roots in its on-going search for an appropriate blueprint that can improve the quality of their lives. From the collectivization of agriculture in the early 70s ending up in food shortages, to loose countenance for private ownership, to a centrally planned economy, Laos is now shifting towards a market economy that allows liberalization of its trade and investment policies and privatization of state enterprises (Croissant and Lorenz, 2018b). But this “New Economic Mechanism” (NEM) faces the risk of failing, with opportunities for self-enrichment available to the Lao Peoples Revolutionary Party (LPRP) becoming the sole instrument controlling both government and economy favoring families, military cadres and co-opted businessmen in the country. This instability that is being taken advantaged of by China at the expense of Laos’ human and natural resources is stirring a call to expand democratic institutions to safeguard the interests of the people of Lao. While strengthening government accountability is what Laos badly needs, the perpetuation of the autocratic regime where economic gains are ensured makes reforms in this area difficult. But the solidification of Laotian people asserting for their fair share in the nation’s resources might very will tilt the balance in the near future.
In Vietnam, the gradual reduction of foreign assistance from communist states worsened their economic crisis resulting to the formulation of their renovation policy called doi moi (Croissant and Lorenz, 2018d) which was highly characterized by the conversion of their centrally-planned economy to a multi-sectoral economy recognizing private property rights and open-door policies in favor of foreign direct investments. Unlike Laos and Cambodia, the inequities that went along the economic growth of Vietnam was negligible as it improved dramatically the livelihood of the different segments of its population. However, this is seen as eroding recently with the seeming incompatibility of the free-market economy with the “three noes” fundamental pillars of Socialist Vietnam. The widening inequality is rearing its ugly head further deepening the cleavage between the rich and the poor, the urban and the rural communities and the public and private sectors of the market.
What I have been trying to establish above is exactly what Myanmar has exemplified by having transitioned from a military regime to a democratic government, albeit, in a very challenging fashion. Myanmar abandoned its plan to establish a centrally-planned economy in favor of rent capitalism in the hope of diversifying economic players in the country warranting both the government and the different ethnic groups a share in the proceeds from the resources within their territory. Yet, despite the democratization of Myanmar’s government, the social inequity remains high, in fact one of the highest in the region. This is because while a civilian government has been installed, the military remains to be in full control of the key state apparatuses relegating subordinate functions to civilians. With the military’s huge stakes in the economic resources of Myanmar, the disparities become even more pronounced.
What we have established so far is to show that a free-market economy is not compatible with autocratic regimes as revealed in the Greater Mekong area. For Mandelbaum (2007), the institutions, values and skills to operate a free-market economy are those that constitute democracy and conversely, the key to establishing a working democracy is through a free-market economy. While majority of the states in the sub-region transitioned from centrally-planned economy to open market economy, they remained having a tight grip on the powers of autocratic regimes. This justifies the brewing clamor of the people for equitable share in their economic gains. Having two contrasting forces therefore, that of the autocrat on one hand and the people on the other hand, it is either the government gives way to democracy or the people continues to submit to autocracy. Given the current circumstances, I believe the former is more likely to happen than the latter. But regardless of the consequence, it is good governance that will define the future of the Greater Mekong sub-region.
Synopsis: The Challenge of Good Governance
Whether it is Morgenthau’s (1973) equilibrium or Waltz’s (1979) bandwagoning that will protect the national interests of the countries in the Greater Mekong area, or whether it is in autocracy or democracy that economic and political survival will be best assured, it all boils down to the values of good governance. Weatherbee (2004) asserts that, “whether the government is democratic or autocratic, military or civilian, capitalist or socialist, the task of government is the same.” We have seen in the cases presented through Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam that bad governance results to instability. The ability of the government to deliver the public good to its people in the light of accountability, equality, transparency, rule of law among others is a material factor in establishing a stable regime.
Good governance requires the government to perform its task in an effective and efficient manner. This authority to manage what Laswell (1936) calls the distributive aspect of who gets what, when and how in a society, necessitates legitimation through the general approval of the people. The ability of CLMV to stabilize their regimes depend on their ability to secure the fundamental goals of good governance (Weatherbee, 2004), to wit: 1] securing and defending the integrity of the state; 2] providing for public order and domestic security; 3] promoting policies in the interest of the public good; 4] implementing these policies fairly and inclusive of all segments of the populace; and 5] mobilizing and deploying the resources necessary to perform the tasks of governance.
Whatever structural political changes may be introduced to CLMV, the problem of instability remains if government leaders continue to perceive that economic plunder outweighs the gains of national interests. It will persist if political elites, whether in democracy or in autocracy, are having difficulty abandoning self-enrichment through control of state apparatuses in favor of diffusing the benefits to all their people. But the ultimate question is, “is there sufficient political will and capacity for good governance in Greater Mekong?”
(Photo: Mekong River Cruises)
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