Objective Reasoning in Social Science
The question of objectivity remains a concern in finding the scientific foundations for making public choices. Risjord (2014) spoke of objectivity as “freedom from pre-existing value commitments,” which basically means that social science must be value-free for when value influences the scientific rigor, policy articulation may be impaired. Many scientists have accused social science as a non-science because it is value-laden. But the puzzle is, should social science be value-free to maintain objectivity if making policy decisions? Or its being value-laden lends some credence to strategic public actions?
Even among the most scientific methods like census, no one can claim absolute freedom from values for population count can be over or under (Risjord, 2014:16) as influenced by certain methodologies involved. Choosing which method to employ alone carries with it some amount of partisan provocation. Because of this, some proponents therefore advance the Strong Thesis of Value Freedom to keep the objective integrity of scientific research unbroken. This may be problematic since selecting from an array of methodological options in itself requires the presence of values for without it, any scholar would find it difficult to measure which method is better at ensuring scientificity of results. This necessitates that a distinction has to be made between epistemic values and political values. What the strong thesis of value freedom proposes is to rid scientific researches with political values but maintain epistemic values since the latter impacts good science.
But for political values to be worthy of consideration, a closer look at the dual role of values is imperative: the constitutive and contextual roles (Risjord, 2014:18). The constitutive role refers to the intrinsic presence of values in science that is essential for the subsistence of any activity. The contextual role of values on the other hand is external to a pursuit. A constitutive political value is perceived not to weaken the objectivity of social science research because it is inherently vital. This is not saying though that contextual political values automatically emasculates the role of objective science because the direction of a research does not necessarily affect the outcomes of a research. But once a course of research has been set, only epistemic values should guide the investigations of one intends to preserve objectivity.
A Moderate Thesis of Value Freedom is also proposed to temper the idealism in the reverence given to pure epistemic values. This nuanced position believes that objectivity is only achieved when “epistemic values are constitutive of scientific practice,” and that political values stay as contextual. The ideal is that scientific inquiries must be free from values. But this is far from real. For values to be constitutive elements of science, they can appear as useful guides in warranting theory selection or must be found as subjects of a theory. In this way, science helps us describe certain phenomenon, but not how it “ought to be.” This is sometimes called value neutrality (Risjord, 2014:20).
Objectivity may be articulated in three different ways according to Sharon Crasnow (2006). One, it means being devoid of any partiality. If this is the case, social science must function to constrain the biases stemming from political values. Secondly, objectivity may mean being accessible to judicious enquiry by the public. This allows intelligent and rational polemic on the outcomes of any scientific research. Lastly, objectivity necessitates reliability, referring to the methods utilized in the investigations such that it is able to produce what is prospectively true.
Social science must therefore use measures as well in order to be more objective. Using these three tests of objectivity, social science can be argues as objective when it comes to reliability and intersubjectivity. Challenges are more pronounced in social science when it is juxtaposed with freedom from biases. However, biases may be limited if social science becomes more open to public scrutiny, where diverse voices engage the results and where the public develops a certain sense of stakeholdership of the outcomes. Therefore, debates on social science research is a vital element in rendering its results solidly objective.
Social Sciene nonetheless, is called to emancipate its subjects from many of the modern-day ideologies where power is unevenly and inequitably distributed. But to be able to do this, social science must be able admit its role in creating this condition that oppresses and marginalizes powerless entities in society. Many of those who set the social science agenda are generally those who had access to power. If it is to perform its emancipatory function, this arena of power in scientific inquiry must be expanded and be made more inclusive.
Viewing social reality can vary depending on the lens used – whether from the lens of a privileged position or from the lens of the oppressed position. Social scientists must therefore make both positions known to all so that the social world can be understood as completely as possible. This means that instead of being value-free, social science must be value-oriented so that it can be engaged by the public, at least theoretically making the role of social science a little sharper than simply describing the world, but more importantly to “improve the human lot, to work for justice and freedom from oppression” (Risjord, 2014:26).
As a tool for understanding the world, social science is required to identify the areas of injustices and oppression and from there commit to its rectification. Justice becomes a constitutive element of social science, hence, an intrinsic value that does not affect the objectivity of science. This does not deny the function of empirical science though especially that the debates involve both descriptive and normative guarantees.
Values and theories are intertwined. As Risjord (2014:29) claimed, “when theories are value-laden, values become theory-laden.” When theories are infused with values, they change. Consequently, these changes will also infuse some changes in values as theories are also affected by the emergence of new acceptable epistemic knowledge. Given this formulation, social policies can both be evidence-based and value free, the latter referring to values being constitutive elements of any social inquiry.
References:
Risjord, Mark. (2014). “Philosophy of Social Science: A Contemporary Introduction.”Routledge, New York and London, 2014, Pp. 34-56.
Crasnow, Sharon. (2006). “Feminist Contributions to Anthropology and Sociology.” In Philosophy of Anthropology and Sociology, edited by S. Turner and M. Risjord. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
