UNDERSTANDING MYANMAR'S FACADE OF DEMOCRACY

I have always been fascinated with Myanmar, not only because of its golden pagodas or the very interesting paste they put on their faces called Thanakha. But more interestingly, its historical-political backdrop makes Myanmar an exciting subject of conversations, whether in class or among friends. I have to make a disclaimer though that I myself is still in the process of understanding Myanmar.

I visited Myanmar twice. Once in 2016 with my travel buddies learning about Myanmar’s rich traditions, peoples and cultures. We walked the roads of Yangon, Naypyitaw, Mandalay and Bagan. During this trip, I discovered that in Myanmar, I can be a millionaire for a day and that the Shwedagon Pagoda, called “The crown of Burma” is topped by a stupa containing over 7,000 diamonds. The next was in 2017 to attend the Jesuit Conference in the Asia Pacific where I learned that while Myanmar supply 70% of the world’s high grade jadestones, the unjust jade mining industry of the country denies many locals the benefit of their own natural mineral resources. On both occasions, I discovered that Myanmar has a deep history of ethnic-based conflict as compounded by a long-sustaining control of its military government led by the Tatmadaw. This is where my opinion piece will revolve this afternoon – finding the nexus of history and politics in the complicated web of civilian-military relations all set in the context of Myanmar’s aspiration of democratic consolidation.

I will attempt to answer three questions:

1. Is Myanmar really on a genuine transition towards constitutional democracy?

2. Why is Myanmar’s Tatmadaw, the military force, so powerful?

3. Was the recent coup de etat about the integrity of the November 2020 elections or is it about a plot to stay in power?

First, Is Myanmar really on a genuine transition towards constitutional democracy?

Myanmar is considered to be one of the most ethnically heterogenous society in Southeast Asia with around 135 recognized ethnic groups. Since its independence in 1948, the multiethnic society has seen a high number of armed conflicts between the central government and a rich tapestry of different insurgent groups driven by nationalist, ideological, or economic motives. These conflicts resulted to the persistence of a praetorian state or one which is under the guardianship of the military, the Tatmadaw, which until today remains a pivotal political actor and a powerful veto player.

With the arrest and detention of the National League of Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the hard repression used to suppress the opposition, the clamor for civilian-led government grew even stronger. In 2008, the SPDC (State Peace and Development Council) presented a new Constitution coming from an rigged referendum. Following Aung San Suu Kyi’s release in 2010, a democratically elected civilian government marked Myanmar’s transition to democracy.

But all these is a façade. Having a constitution where 1] military is given exclusive control over the interior and border protection ministries implies oversight of the police and the prison system; 2] military is also the mandated head of the General Administration Department, which oversees all administrative personnel; and 3] under a state of emergency, all executive authority is transferred to the commander-in-chief – this is a kind of constitution that gives the military a de facto control over the whole civilian bureaucracy. The civilian government is practically a in the hands of the military.

Under this same constitution, presidential authority to issue decrees need confirmation by the parliament that is also empowered to overturn a presidential veto. While appearing to sound as a “usual process” in government, it may be rendered suspicious until we learned that the constitution also requires 1] that of the 440 members of the house of representatives, 330 are elected by popular vote, the remaining 110 are appointed by the military; 2] that of the 224 seats in the upper house, 56 seats are reserved to the military making a total of 166 military serving in the parliament and where only 167 votes needed to appoint the President and pass laws, the military is technically also in control of the legislature; and 3] that 25% of the locally elected seats belong to the members of the military clearly puts the Tatmadaw in a position to still lord over the entire Myanmar. With what happened in the recent coup of the military and the reinstallation of the military government, it is clear that the façade of democracy has been rediscovered and the international community stood witness to this thereby making the democratic consolidation illusory in Myanmar.

Second question, why is the Tatmadaw so powerful?

Myanmar, historically is a state born of military occupation. It was and still is the brainchild of a military regime. Here are some reasons why the Tatmadaw has perpetuated themselves into power, enduring years of civilian resistance.

1. The military rule in Myanmar is a result of what is called a “corporative coup.” The 1962 coup bringing Gen. Ne Win into power and the installation of SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) in 1988 were all the works of key military elites through which the relevant power groups were included by the military junta, eventually making them part of the Tatmadaw. The military government was composed entirely of military officers loyal to Gen. Ne Win resulting to a hierarchical military regime where power sharing revolved only around the political elites ensuring that no factions would challenge the sitting government. In short, co-optation of the powerful elites to immunize the military government from countercoups.

2. The Tatmadaw created mass organizations like the (BSPP Burmese Socialist Program Party) and the USDA (Union Solidarity and Development Association) stressing the military’s leadership on the “Burmese Way to Socialism” vision eventually recalibrating this as a dream of establishing a “disciplined democracy.” The military government attempted to fortify state-society relations or civil-military relations by indoctrinating the people, creating paramilitary units and repression of dissidents. This is founded also on the propaganda that the military regime is the only reliable and functioning national institution that can defend the nation against separatist insurgencies in the peripheries.

3. The Tatmadaw allowed direct military control over the most lucrative branches of the national economy where regional commanders and military units were also allowed to pursue their own business interests. In the same 2008 Constitution, the military is in control over the country’s mining, oil and gas industries, thus ensuring a continuous flow of resources. This arrangement gave the Tatmadaw complete financial independence, and allowed it to easily resist any international and domestic calls for reform for years. A report by Amnesty International in 2020 revealed that Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL), controlled by the Tatmadaw had netted $18bn between 1990 and 2010 through military-controlled businesses, which invested the majority of revenue back into the military’s budget.

With all this powers tucked under the belt of the Tatmadaw, it is no surprise that they can take back government control, especially when their power is threatened. This leads me to the third question.

Was the recent coup de etat about the integrity of the November 2020 elections or is it about a plot to stay in power

While Min Aung Hlaing, the Military Chief of Myanmar, suspected massive fraud in the November 2020 elections giving the NLD a landslide victory, the military government’s reaction to snatch power back from the civilian runs suspect of its true intentions. As I have described earlier, the parliament, to install Min Aung Hlaing needed only 167 votes to be appointed President. In the recent elections, the USDP (Union for Solidarity and Development Party) only won 33 seats with the opposition NLD having 396 seats giving the military the realization that it had no other means to regain presidency other than a coup. To get the presidency, the military had to act outside the law, under the pretext of alleged massive electoral fraud. Since becoming the commander in chief in 2011 during the transition, Gen Hlaing has positioned himself to presidency with his refusal to retire in 2016 as mandated by their law.

But the coup is not only preserving Hlaing’s political influence but also his wealth. Businesses owned by Min Aung Hlaing’s children have profited from their access to state resources during his tenure and noted that as commander-in-chief, Ming Aung Hlaing has ultimate authority over the military’s two major conglomerates – Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) – which hold investments in various sectors, including gems, copper, telecoms and clothing. Should democratic consolidation strengthen with the landslide victory of the NLD, Hlaing and his family shall stand to lose their sources of revenue.And having been historically alluded to as the guardian of the nation, the most convenient way to protect his desire for power and wealth is to mobilize the military, in the name of the 2008 constitution.

CONCLUSION

Exploring the political milieu of Myanmar, I can’t help but also think of the Philippines in comparison, especially so that we have recently commemorated the 35 anniversary of the Peoples Power Revolution. While there are stark differences, there is also a stream of similarities.

Democratic consolidation in the Philippines began with EDSA Revolution in 1986, while Myanmar began with the 8888 Uprising. While the former was a peaceful revolt, the latter was marred with bloodshed and deaths. The Filipinos were battling a dictatorship, whereas the Burmese were fighting the military regime. The Burmese were committed to fight sword with sword, the Filipinos fought guns with roses. The people power gravitated around the narrative of a woman – Cory Aquino, so did the Burmese around Aung San Suu Kyi. Also, the demands for autonomy from different ethnic groups, resonates with the assertion of self-governance in Mindanao.

35 years since EDSA and 33 years since the 8888 uprising, both Myanmar and the Philippines continue to confrontthe challenges of democratic consolidation. While Myanmar is in a crisis with their civilian government wrestled from them, the Filipinos are witnessing an ever widening social cleavage under a populist regime. Myanmar’s coup speaks volume of the failures of democracy in Asia. And the questions beg for answers: Is this the period of democratic decay? Or is this the new wave of political re-ordering?

The Tatmadaw may not give up power anytime soon even if it promised one year to restore civilian government. But the Tatmadaw and the Myanpar people must heed the lessons of history if they are to secure a free future.

“The power of the people is much stronger than the people in power.” - Wael Ghonim, Internet Activist

Photo credit: Bloomberg.ca